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A R T I C L E S

Dual Electricity Federalism Is Dead,
But How Dead, and What Replaces It?
Joel B. Eisen*

I

n a remarkable burst of activity, the U.S. Supreme Court
decided three cases in the past year involving the split
of jurisdiction between the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (“FERC”) and the states in the energy sector.
FERC v. Electric Power Supply Ass’n1 and Hughes v. Talen
Energy Marketing 2 dealt with the relationship between FERC
and the states in governing the electric grid under the Federal
Power Act (“FPA”). ONEOK v. Learjet3 involved regulation
of natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”),
which also serves as precedent for decisions involving the
electric grid.4
These watershed decisions5 herald a new approach to governing the rapid evolution of the modern electric grid, but its
precise contours will not be known for some time. They mark
the end of “dual federalism” in electricity law6 that treated
* Joel B. Eisen is a Professor of Law and Austin Owen Research Fellow
at The University of Richmond School of Law. The author thanks
Emily Hammond, Felix Mormann, and Shelley Welton for their
insights, as well as the George Washington University Law School for
its kind invitation to participate in the 2016 J.B. and Maurice C.
Shapiro Environmental Law Symposium, “The Electricity Mix of the
Future: Environment, Economics, and Governance,” at which the
author presented on this topic.
1.
2.
3.
4.

5.

6.

FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
The NGA and FPA are read in pari materia. Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State
Corp. Comm’n of Kan., 489 U.S. 493, 506 (1989) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 717cd); Ky. Util. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985). Section
1(b) of the NGA, like section 206 of the FPA, gives FERC authority over
“practices . . . affecting rates.” Compare 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a), with 16 U.S.C.
§ 824e(a).
Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity Industry of the Future, 68 Stan. L. Rev. Online 100 (2016) (noting that FERC v.
EPSA “may ultimately rank among the most significant energy law cases of all
time”); Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector,
40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 1, 7 (2016) (terming FERC v. EPSA a “landmark”
decision) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity
Sector]; Anne Hoskins & Paul Roberti, The Essential Role of State Engagement in
Demand Response, 40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 14, 14 (2016) (Commissioners
of two state PUCs term FERC v. EPSA “a defining moment in evolution of
competitive electric markets”).
Jim Rossi, The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism, 95 Tex. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016) (“For many decades following the New Deal, dual sovereignty
coexisted rather peacefully with traditional utility rate regulation in energy
industries.”); Hannah J. Wiseman, Moving Past Dual Federalism to Advance
Electric Grid Neutrality, 100 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 97, 99 (2015). For discussions
of dual federalism, see generally Robert Post, Federalism in the Taft Court Era:
Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 Duke L.J. 1513 (2002), and Ernest A. Young, Dual
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federal and state regulators as operating within separate and
distinct spheres of authority,7 recognizing instead that state
and federal initiatives frequently overlap. The Court has
provided guidance to govern the interaction between FERC
and the states going forward, but has also left considerable
uncertainty. The impacts of these decisions will reverberate
for years to come.
This transformative change in electricity law reflects the
tectonic shift occurring today in the electric grid. For over six
decades after the FPA’s enactment in 1935, the nation’s system
of making electricity and delivering it to customers was stable
and predictable.8 The nation’s major utilities were vertically
integrated monopolies, much as the phone system once was.
Utilities generated electricity in their power plants, moved it
across their transmission wires, and delivered it to their customers.9 State public utility commissions regulated utilities’
rates and services to guard against the ills of monopolization.10
Now, there is change everywhere. Solar and wind power
is being rapidly added to the grid.11 This power is generated
at the edge of the grid in places like residential rooftops
and remote wind farms, rather than in central power stations. It requires new transmission lines, grid connections
Federalism, Concurrent Jurisdiction, and the Foreign Affairs Exception, 69 Geo.
Wash. L. Rev. 139 (2001).
7. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that, after FERC v. EPSA,
“there is no bright line preventing state utility commissions and the FERC
from working in concert to advance a more efficient electricity system.”); Jim
Rossi & Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy Resources, 40 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. F. 23, 24 (2016) (“Rather
than fixate on this divide, the EPSA majority approached FERC’s jurisdiction
in a functional manner, endorsing pragmatism over formalism in the regulation of energy markets.”). For discussions of the jurisdictional “bright line,” see
generally Robert R. Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and
State Regulation of Today’s Electric Grid, 36 Energy L.J. 203 (2015), and Rossi,
supra note 6.
8. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 207; Rossi, supra note 6, at *4.
9. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002) (“When the FPA became law, most
electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities that had constructed their
own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery systems.”).
10. Rossi, supra note 6, at **33–34.
11. Solar, Natural Gas, Wind Make Up Most 2016 Generation Additions, U.S. Energy Info. Admin. (Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.
cfm?id=25172 (showing that solar and wind make up more that two-thirds
of scheduled capacity additions for 2016, and that “2016 will be the first year
in which utility-scale solar additions exceed additions from any other single
energy source”); see also David Roberts, There’s a Lot More Solar Power in the
US Than We Thought, Vox: Energy & Env’t (July 2, 2015), http://www.vox.
com/2015/7/2/8880311/solar-power-underestimated (claiming that EIA data
may underestimate solar capacity by as much as one-third due to undercounting of small-scale rooftop solar PV systems).
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and advanced management of increasingly diverse sources
of power on the grid to protect its reliability.12 New business models, technologies and upstart competitors such as
demand response aggregators and solar leasing firms are
competing with traditional utilities.13 The utilities face a
challenging competitive environment,14 as shown vividly by
debates over net metering and solar demand charges in well
over two dozen states that highlight important issues relating to the industry shift.15
Today’s grid is dramatically transforming into a Smart
Grid.16 Technologies like battery storage,17 demand response,
electric vehicles,18 and “microgrids” (self-sustaining areas
largely disconnected from the traditional grid)19 are game
changers. For example, if storage becomes more widely available and less expensive than Tesla’s “Powerwall,”20 consumers
could keep the power they make from solar panels and provide it back to the grid when it would be most advantageous
for them to do so.21 Not far off in the future, the electric
grid may be a transactive system22 where power is traded23
12. Joel B. Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, 37 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 12 (2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid].
13. William Boyd, Public Utility and the Low-Carbon Future, 61 UCLA L. Rev.
1614, 1677 (2014) (discussing solar leasing firms); Joel B. Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid? FERC’s Authority Over Demand Response Compensation
in Wholesale Electricity Markets, 4 San Diego J. Climate & Energy L. 69
(2013) [hereinafter Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?] (discussing demand
response aggregators).
14. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1677 (noting that with increased deployment of distributed generation, “incumbent utilities, . . . are left with significant reductions in
demand from their higher-end distributed generation (DG) customers and a
shrinking number of non-DG customers left to pay systems costs.”); see generally Edison Elec. Inst., Disruptive Challenges: Financial Implications
and Strategic Responses to a Changing Retail Electric Business (2013),
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf.
15. Boyd, supra note 13, at 1678; see also infra notes 165, 167, and accompanying text.
16. See generally Eisen, Smart Regulation and Federalism for the Smart Grid, supra
note 12.
17. See generally Amy L. Stein, Reconsidering Regulatory Uncertainty: Making a Case
for Energy Storage, 41 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 697 (2014).
18. Mark Detsky & Gabriella Stockmayer, Electric Vehicles: Rolling Over Barriers
and Merging With Regulation, 40 Wm. & Mary Envtl. L. & Pol’y Rev. 477,
478 (2016) (noting that “EVs are yet another nuance for utilities and regulators managing the impacts of distributed generation, demand-side management, smart grid, storage, net metering, and demand response technologies
that have disrupted the electric utility market in the last decade”).
19. Joel B. Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff: Removing Barriers to Innovation on the Smart Grid, 61 UCLA L. Rev. 1712, 1719 (2014) [hereinafter
Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff]; see also Sara C. Bronin, Curbing
Energy Sprawl With Microgrids, 43 Conn. L. Rev. 547 (2010); Uma Outka,
The Energy-Land Use Nexus, 27 J. Land Use & Envtl. L. 245, 256 (2012).
For a discussion of microgrids as a potential strategy for responding to climate
change, see also James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on During Superstorm Sandy: Climate Change Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation, 23 N.Y.U. Envtl. L. J. 92 (2015).
20. Tesla Power Wall, Tesla, https://www.teslamotors.com/powerwall (last visited
May 9, 2016).
21. Shelley Welton, Clean Energy Justice, Colo. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2016)
(manuscript at 7) (discussing a “participatory grid” that “allow[s] consumers
to use power when it is cheapest, and to supply power back to the grid when
it is most expensive, thereby maintaining affordability.”); Rossi, supra note
6, at 4 (noting that “[c]ustomers . . . sometimes are even becoming energy
suppliers themselves”).
22. See generally GridWise Architectural Council, GridWise Transactive
Energy Framework Version 1.0 (2015), http://www.gridwiseac.org/pdfs/
te_framework_report_pnnl-22946.pdf (discussing the attributes of a transactive energy system).
23. See generally Sharon Jacobs, Consumer Generation, Ecol. L.Q. (forthcoming
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rather than simply consumed. Recognizing this, California
and New York are experimenting with overhauling the entire
system in which electricity is distributed to customers.24 The
watchword is change, and more of it is promised at a dizzying rate.
The grid’s architecture has also changed dramatically. The
regional wholesale markets that now trade over two-thirds
of the nation’s electricity under FERC oversight have existed
only since the 1990s.25 And, as a result of the restructuring
(partial deregulation) of the 1990s, another major change
took place at the retail level. Consumers in sixteen states
and the District of Columbia can choose to have their electricity delivered by suppliers other than their utilities.26 In
Maryland, where the events leading to Hughes took place,
roughly one-fourth of all residential customers are served in
this fashion.27
The result is a complex, diverse and rapidly evolving
system of electricity generation, transmission and delivery.
The FPA’s drafters would have considerable difficulty recognizing today’s grid.28 The statute’s core provisions, however, are virtually unchanged since 1935,29 when FDR was
a year away from trouncing Alf Landon, the number one
movie was Clark Gable’s Mutiny on the Bounty, and a pound
of sugar cost five cents. Under the FPA, FERC regulates
the transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and
rates, terms, and conditions of wholesale sales (any sales
that are for resale, that is, not to an eventual consumer).30
It also has the power to order a remedy if it finds a “rule,
regulation, practice, or contract affecting such [wholesale]
rate” to be “unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
preferential.”31 The states regulate retail sales to end users,
2016).
24. See discussion infra Part II.
25. Seven regional grid operators, known as “independent system operators”
(ISOs) and “regional transmission organizations” (RTOs) today operate markets and “serve over one-half of the nation and provide two-thirds of the nation’s electricity.” Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the
Electric Grid, 49 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1783 (2016) [hereinafter Eisen, FERC’s
Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid]. For discussions of the development of the wholesale markets, see Emily Hammond & David B. Spence,
The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 Vand. L. Rev. 141, 143 (2016),
and David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 Cornell L. Rev. 765, 769 (2008); see also Benefits of a Regional Market, Cal.
Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., https://www.caiso.com/informed/Pages/RegionalEnergyMarket/BenefitsofaRegionalEnergyMarket.aspx (last visited May 10,
2016) (discussing the possible transformation of the California ISO into an
energy market spanning the entire West).
26. Status of Electricity Restructuring by State, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., http://
www.eia.gov/electricity/policies/restructuring/restructure_elect.html (last visited May 10, 2016).
27. Electric Choice: Monthly Enrollment Reports, Md. Pub. Svc. Comm’n, http://
www.psc.state.md.us/electricity/electric-choice-monthly-enrollment-reports/
(last visited May 10, 2016) (providing March 2016 report, which shows
21.7% of residential customers are served by retail suppliers).
28. Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 198 (noting that the FPA did not
envision today’s wholesale markets); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith,
Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing
Storm?, 35 Energy L.J. 71, 73 (2014) (noting that “[t]he electricity industry
has changed in fundamental ways . . . never contemplated by the drafters of
the FPA”).
29. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1786.
30. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b). FERC’s transmission jurisdiction is therefore much
broader than its sale jurisdiction. Rossi, supra note 6, at 10 n.33.
31. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a).
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siting of power plants and transmission lines, and other
matters.32 This jurisdictional divide between “wholesale”
and “retail” reflected Congressional intent to close the
“Attleboro gap,” named for the 1927 Supreme Court decision that proclaimed that the federal government regulated
sales of electricity that crossed state lines.33
In 1935 and for decades thereafter, jurisdiction over the
electric grid could be neatly fenced off at state borders.34 This
bright line was typical of the early twentieth century’s dual
federalism, which posited that federal and state regulatory
authority could be separated neatly into exclusive spheres.35
In today’s interconnected electricity network, this no longer
makes sense. A system of shared responsibility is more appropriate than a jurisdictional bright line, as both the states and
FERC are taking actions simultaneously to influence such
matters as how many power plants get built and how much
renewable energy is added to the grid.36 In this new environment, many state or federal actions can have impacts on
both retail electricity rates and wholesale markets. A bright
line jurisdictional test is impractical in these situations,37 and
forces an arbitrary choice that deprives a level of government
of opportunities to promote innovation.
Instead, a system of shared, or concurrent federalism,
would be more useful. If designed properly, it would minimize jurisdictional disputes and promote the respective capabilities of FERC and the states for innovating on the grid,
while protecting reliability and other attributes that are central to the grid’s operation.38 A modern analogue is environmental law’s “cooperative federalism,” where states and the
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) share responsibility for implementing environmental laws. But the eightyyear-old framework still calls for FERC and the states to

32. 16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (explaining that FERC authority does not extend to sales
beyond those at wholesale); see also Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 1789. FPA section 201(a) provides that
FERC’s authority “shall only extend to those matters which are not subject
to regulation by the States,” and appears to give broad leeway to the states,
but has consistently been interpreted as “’prefatory’ in nature, a mere ‘policy
declaration’ that ‘cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even
if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.’”
Rossi, supra note 6, at 15; see Brief for Energy Law Scholars Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, at 14, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760
(2016) (No. 14-840).
33. See generally Pub. Util. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273
U.S. 83 (1927).
34. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 207 (noting that, during this time, “[i]t was clear
which sales were at wholesale and which at retail, and the FERC was fairly
readily able to distinguish transmission from distribution”).
35. See generally Rossi, supra note 6.
36. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1789; Rossi, supra note 6, at 4.
37. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27 (observing that “the FPA’s allocation
of federal-state authority over practices affecting rates cannot always result in a
strict separation of authority, as a jurisdictional bright line would dictate”).
38. Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 1621, 1627 (2015)
(noting that scholars are beginning to discuss an energy federalism model “that
would treat federal and state jurisdiction not as independent or mere substitutes but, instead, as interdependent and complementary”); see generally Hari
M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72 Md. L.
Rev. 773 (2013); Rossi, supra note 6; cf. Heather Gerken, Our Federalism(s),
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1549, 1551 (2012) (“It would be useful if scholars
were more attentive to the fact that the questions federalism raises need not
involve an either/or answer. Often they will involve a both/and.”).
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operate independently. This is the last vestige of dual federalism, which elsewhere is long gone from the national scene.39
The Supreme Court could not act simply because the
FPA’s bright line may not fit today’s realities. Without Congressional action, of course, the Court could not change the
FPA’s text, nor could it render an advisory opinion to reinterpret the FPA. Under the Constitution, there must be a
case or controversy that the Court can hear.40 Even that is
no guarantee that the case will find its way to the Supreme
Court, which controls its docket and takes few of the cases
presented to it.41 Usually, the Court takes cases where two or
more circuit courts have split on the issues.42 Hughes featured
no circuit split, for the two Circuits that considered the issues
agreed about the FPA’s reach.43 Nor did FERC v. EPSA,
which originated in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, and
ONEOK, which involved a Ninth Circuit decision without
any corresponding decision of another Circuit.44
In the absence of a circuit split or a case invoking its
original jurisdiction, the Court chooses cases it believes are
of utmost national importance.45 Here, the Court felt compelled to tackle three cases that squarely presented variations
on the question introduced above: which level of government should control the transition underway in the electric
grid? Inevitably, given the concurrent actions by both levels
of government, conflicts were bound to—and did—arise.
The Court’s decisions addressed these conflicts and aimed to
allocate responsibility for decisions affecting the grid going
forward, within the limitations of statutory language written
many years ago.46
In Part I, this Article describes the results in all three
decisions, and explains the guidance the Court has given
for future cases. The purpose is not to synthesize the results
into a unified doctrine, which would be inconsistent with the
Court’s approach in these cases. ONEOK, the Hughes majority opinion, Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes, and
Justice Kagan’s “notable solicitude” for the states in FERC
v. EPSA, all demonstrate the Court’s reluctance to fashion
a comprehensive new jurisdictional bright line. Part I concludes that the Court has not applied a single test for determining the limits of federal and state jurisdiction. Instead, it
has articulated several different guiding principles, each of
which may have application in specific situations.
39. Young, supra note 6, at 139 (noting that “‘dual federalism[ ]’ died an ignominious death in 1937 or shortly thereafter”).
40. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.
41. Ryan J. Owens & David A. Simon, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Shrinking
Docket, 53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1219 (2012) (“Since the 2005 Term, the
Court has decided an average of 80 cases per Term[.]”).
42. Sup. Ct. R. 10; Ryan Stephenson, Federal Circuit Case Selection at the Supreme
Court: An Empirical Analysis, 102 Geo. L.J. 271, 272 (terming the circuit split
the Court’s “most potent case-selection tool”).
43. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct at 1296–99 (2016).
44. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 760–89 (2016); ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1591
(2015).
45. Sup. Ct. R. 10. In its petition for certiorari in FERC v. EPSA, for example,
the Solicitor General stated that “[t]he question whether FERC has authority
to regulate the participation of demand-response providers in wholesale-electricity [sic] markets has substantial national importance and thus warrants this
Court’s review.” Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply
Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
46. See discussion infra Sections I.A, I.B, I.C.
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Parts II and III consider the impacts of the three decisions
on FERC and the states. Part II discusses and applies the
FERC v. EPSA test for FERC’s authority under the FPA to
regulate “practices” “directly affecting” wholesale rates. This
new authority empowers FERC to take action to substantially
overhaul the electric grid.47 The analysis in Part II focuses
on the intersection of FERC’s new authority with ambitious
state programs underway to transform the grid. The first is
California’s regional grid operator’s proposal to integrate distributed energy resources (“DERs”) into wholesale markets.
The second is the component of the New York “Reforming
the Energy Vision” (“REV”) proposal that would create “distribution system platform providers” (“DSPPs”) to coordinate activities involving aggregation of electricity resources
and distribution to end users.
Examining the intersection of state and federal jurisdiction in the implementation of these programs allows for an
assessment of FERC’s role in reshaping the grid, and the
potential for shared or concurrent jurisdiction. In both cases,
Part II concludes that FERC can use its new authority to
influence policy development. It identifies areas where the
states and FERC share jurisdictional authority, and notes
areas where FERC and the states could develop cooperative arrangements that promote the states’ ambitious visions
while minimizing jurisdictional disputes.
Part III discusses and applies the holding and dicta of
Hughes in the context of two state initiatives. One is a hypothetical property tax exemption granted by a Virginia city to
provide an incentive for a power plant to locate there. The
other is a New York program proposed in early 2016 to provide support payments to keep three of the state’s nuclear
power plants in operation. Part III concludes that Hughes
raises more questions than it answers about which state initiatives are permissible. This may be the new bottom line about
both federal and state electricity regulators’ authority after the
three decisions studied here: more questions than answers.

I.

The Three Decisions

A.

ONEOK v. Learjet

The first of the three decisions was 2015’s ONEOK v. Learjet. In 2003, trade publications were a benchmark for setting prices in the natural gas market, and these publications
relied on voluntary price reports from natural gas traders.48
FERC discovered that some traders had been reporting
false price information that skewed natural gas prices.49 A
group of gas purchasers then brought state antitrust suits
against the interstate natural gas pipelines, claiming they
had overpaid for the natural gas they purchased, because
47. See discussion infra Part II.
48. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597; Emily Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional
Boundaries: A Call for Course Correction, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Docket (Oct.
Term 2014).
49. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597 (“FERC found that false reporting had involved
inflating the volume of trades, omitting trades, and adjusting the price of
trades, . . . That is, sometimes those who reported information simply fabricated it.”) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
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the pipelines had allegedly manipulated the price indices.50
They claimed they had been overcharged due to pipelines’
manipulation that affected prices in both wholesale and
retail natural gas markets.
The Court was therefore forced to choose whether FERC
or state courts held sway. There was no suggestion that the
NGA expressly foreclosed the state antitrust actions. Instead,
the pipelines (and the federal government, supporting them)
argued that the state actions were barred by implied preemption. There are two types of implied preemption: “field” and
“conflict” preemption.51 “Field preemption” occurs when the
federal law is so comprehensive that Congress has intended
for federal regulation to occupy the entire field and displace
any state laws.52 “Conflict preemption” consists of two different varieties: “impossibility” preemption (“compliance with
both state and federal law is impossible”)53 and “purposes
and objectives” (or “obstacle”) preemption, under which “the
state law ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.’”54
In all of these situations, the statute is held to have implicitly
preempted the state’s action and federal law prevails.55
The litigants in ONEOK focused on the doctrine of field
preemption, and made no attempt to argue that conflict preemption governed.56 Under the field preemption doctrine,
if federal supremacy is based on a statute (as here with the
NGA), the court looks to Congressional purpose and decides
whether Congress intended for federal regulators to comprehensively occupy a field.57 In that case, federal law preempts
all state laws on the subject. The relevant provision of the
NGA was section 5(a),58 which contains the same “practices affecting rates” authority as the FPA. With respect to
a wholesale rate for natural gas transactions, this subsection
gives FERC authority to determine whether “any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or
classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory,
or preferential,”59 and to order a remedy.
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion held that FERC did not
have exclusive authority to protect pipeline customers under
this statutory provision.60 The Court found that the NGA
did not foreclose actions taken under state antitrust laws to
recover damages for manipulation of the natural gas mar50. Id. at 1598.
51. Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 Va. L. Rev. 225, 226 (2000).
52. Id. at 227; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at 1845.
53. Nelson, supra note 51, at 227–28; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at
1845–46.
54. Nelson, supra note 51, at 228 n.14 (citing a number of cases, including an
energy law decision mentioned in ONEOK); see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at
1595; Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300 (1988); Eisen,
FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25, at
1845.
55. Nelson, supra note 51, at 228–29; see also ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595.
56. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595 (“Nor have the parties argued at any length that
these state suits conflict with federal law.”).
57. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1595; Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption
and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. Rev. 1283, 1355 (2013).
58. 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a).
59. Id.
60. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600–01.
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ket.61 It rejected a field preemption argument that would have
barred state laws if “the matter on which the State asserts the
right to act is in any way regulated by the [NGA].”62 Instead,
the Court stated, preemption of state laws must be determined with reference to “the target at which the state law
aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”63
The Court then drew a distinction between “‘traditional’
state regulation,” such as antitrust and state blue sky laws,
which “are not aimed at natural-gas companies in particular,
but rather all businesses in the marketplace.”64 Because the
antitrust laws govern a wide variety of industries, and not
just natural gas pipelines, the state lawsuits would stand. If,
however, the Court had been presented with a state law that
“aimed directly at interstate purchasers and wholesales for
resale,”65 the NGA would have preempted it. There was no
further guidance about the distinction between traditional
regulation and that which “aim[s] directly” at the wholesale
markets. That would come later in Hughes.

B.

FERC v. EPSA

In FERC v. EPSA, Justice Elena Kagan, writing for a sixJustice majority, upheld Order 745,66 a FERC rule requiring
that regional grid operators compensate aggregated bids of
“demand response” (reductions in electricity consumption
in response to grid emergencies or price signals)67 at the same
wholesale market price paid to generators in the wholesale
energy markets.68 In its rule, FERC recognized that using
demand-side measures to reduce peak stress on the grid can
help balance supply and demand, improve reliability, and
decrease peak electricity prices.69 In the D.C. Circuit, the association representing power producers and its supporters had
argued successfully that FERC did not have authority under
the FPA to make this rule, and that demand response was
wholly within state jurisdiction because it affected end users.70
The Court reversed this decision.71 It confirmed FERC’s
authority over “practices” affecting wholesale rates for electricity, stated that demand response was such a practice, and
61. See id. at 1601.
62. Id. at 1600–01. The Court noted that FERC had not argued that field preemption applied, so it need not address whether such a finding might be entitled to
deference under City of Arlington. See id. at 1602–03.
63. Id. at 1599.
64. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600–01.
65. Id. at 1600.
66. See Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,
Order No. 745, 134 FERC ¶ 61,187 (Mar. 15, 2011).
67. FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767; see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path
to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5, at 1–2. For analysis of demand
response and Order 745, see Eisen, Who Regulates the Smart Grid?, supra note
13 (discussing and advocating judicial affirmance of Order 745), and Richard
J. Pierce Jr., A Primer on Demand Response and a Critique of FERC Order 745,
102 Geo. Wash. J. Energy & Envtl. L. 102 (2011).
68. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
69. See id. at 767; see also Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity
Sector, supra note 5, at 3–4.
70. See Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 223–24 (D.C. Cir.
2014), rev’d and remanded, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760
(2016). Had this decision stood, it would have “threatened to disable [demand
response], with serious implications for consumers as well as DR suppliers.”
Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 16.
71. See FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767.
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upheld Order 745.72 It rejected the argument that demand
response was exclusively a state matter, finding that adding
it to wholesale markets impacted prices in those markets.73
Even if its policies would have impacts on the states and retail
electricity rates, FERC was not foreclosed from acting.74
The Court articulated a standard for upholding FERC
initiatives such as Order 745: FERC can regulate practices
if wholesale rates are “directly” affected.75 To the Court, the
demand response rule was a prime example of this because
injecting demand reductions into wholesale markets immediately impacts wholesale prices.76 As it stated succinctly,
“Wholesale demand response, in short, is all about reducing wholesale rates; so too, then, the rules and practices that
determine how those programs operate.”77 The Court concluded, “it is hard to think of a practice” that has a more
direct impact on wholesale rates.78 It contrasted this to activities that have “indirect or tangential impacts” on wholesale
markets, rejecting the D.C. Circuit’s argument that FERC
could regulate the steel or labor markets if it so chose.79
As opaque as the “directly affecting” test may appear, it
has solid grounding in over 100 years of doctrine dating to
federal regulation of railroads in the early twentieth century.80 The FERC v. EPSA test was not fashioned from whole
cloth. Instead, it was the natural evolution of decades of judicial decisions in a number of regulated industries whose governing statutes granted federal agencies authority to regulate
“practices affecting rates,” including, of course, the electricity
industry.81 Originally, “practices affecting rates” jurisdiction
focused on discrimination by individual firms such as railroads.82 As the era of modern regulatory statutes—including the FPA—began in the 1930s, “practices” were those
required to be listed in rate-setting tariffs, providing notice
to customers and obligating utilities to provide service under
tariff terms and conditions.83 Today, as the industry focus
has shifted to markets—and FERC’s oversight has shifted to
ensuring that market structures lead to just and reasonable
rates—“practices affecting rates” means details of market
operations and the activities that directly influence them.84
The well-recognized limit of “directness”85 has two essential components. The first requires the impact on wholesale
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

85.

See id. at 773–75.
See id. at 776.
See id.
See id. at 774.
FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774.
Id.
Id. at 775.
Id. at 774.
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1797.
Id. at 115; Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector,
supra note 5, at 6.
Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1797–1806.
Id. at 125–30.
Id. at 131–32. The tariff continues to be used as a regulatory device, even
though other industries have discarded it. Id. at 131 n.145 (noting statutory reforms that discarded New Deal-era statutes). However, its nature has
changed; it now is a document listing market features and operations, with
FERC oversight and approval. Id.
Rossi, supra note 6, at 36 (terming this an “established test”).
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rates to be proximate in both time and causative effect.86
The FERC v. EPSA majority discussed this aspect of the
test’s articulation in California ISO,87 where the D.C. Circuit struck down FERC’s action requiring that the California
ISO choose its board of directors in a specific manner. There,
the D.C. Circuit concluded that FERC had provided no evidence to show that a change in corporate governance could
influence rates.88 Contrast the situation of demand response:
as the FERC v. EPSA court observed, injecting demand
reductions into wholesale markets has an immediate impact
on rates.
Under case law both preceding and following California
ISO, it is not necessary that there be an immediate cause and
effect relationship between the action evaluated and wholesale rates.89 Reflecting this, the D.C. Circuit in California ISO
empowered FERC to regulate practices “that directly affect
the rate or are closely related to the rate[.]”90 However, the
presence of too many intermediate actions before any potential impact would be felt negates an action’s directness. California ISO is a good example of this: it would take numerous
actions after a change in a board of directors to influence
market rates. The D.C. Circuit thought it “absurd” to call
this a practice affecting rates, concluding that FERC could
not regulate “those remote things beyond the rate structure
that might in some sense indirectly or ultimately” affect wholesale rates.91
A D.C. Circuit decision that found a closer link between
FERC’s action and wholesale rates is South Carolina Public Service Authority v. FERC (“SCPSA”).92 SCPSA upheld
FERC’s Order 1000, which required that regional transmission organizations (“RTOs”) engage in transmission planning processes and devise methods of allocating the costs of
new transmission lines.93 It would take numerous intermediate actions before a regional transmission plan would impact
rates by reducing congestion, including all of the local and
state approvals necessary to site and construct an individual
transmission line. Still, the court found that regional transmission planning was a practice affecting rates, distinguishing FERC’s attempt to influence corporate governance in
California ISO.94 Thus, the link to a change in wholesale rates
need not be immediate, as long as there is a proximate relationship between FERC’s action and market rates.95
A second component of “directness” is economic. The
practice being regulated must have a quantifiable impact on
86. Id. at 57.
87. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see
also Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note
25, at 1830–33 (discussing the decision of the D.C. Circuit).
88. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403.
89. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note
25, at 1829 (discussing the origins of this interpretation in regulations and
case law).
90. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403 (emphasis added).
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. S.C. Pub. Serv. Auth. v. FERC, 762 F.3d 41 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
93. Id. (upholding Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission
Owning and Operating Public Utilities, Order No. 1000, 36 FERC ¶ 61,051
(2011)).
94. Id. For example, rates have to increase or decrease.
95. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1828–29.

Vol. 8 No. 1

wholesale rates.96 Moreover, the California ISO court, drawing upon other cases interpreting the “practices affecting
rates” language, used a threshold that rates must be impacted
“significantly.”97 In FERC v. EPSA, a significant impact on
rates is implied from the large amounts of demand response
bids and their impacts on market rates.
Decisions upholding FERC authority over such matters as capacity market designs had discussed this modern
understanding of FERC’s jurisdiction over practices affecting wholesale market rates.98 Before FERC v. EPSA, however, no one decision had cogently articulated both the test
and directness limitation with its analytical depth and rigor.
FERC v. EPSA crystallized the doctrine and distilled it into a
test that can be applied in future judicial decisions. Coupled
with the well-recognized limitation that FERC’s initiatives
have a “direct” impact on wholesale rates over which it has
jurisdiction, FERC v. EPSA’s grant of authority to FERC
yields a clearer picture of FERC’s role in a system of concurrent jurisdiction.99
FERC v. EPSA also swept away the bright line that demarcated state and federal jurisdiction. By explaining both
FERC’s Order 745 and states’ actions in the same decision,
the Court demonstrated that FERC can and will act at the
same time as the states.100 Demand response is a prototypical example of concurrent action.101 The Court mentioned
FERC’s “notable solicitude” for state demand response programs, and states can conduct a wide range of programs without involving FERC.102 For example, a state could approve a
utility’s proposal to conduct a demand response program for
its own retail customers.103 This could have impacts in the
wholesale markets, as the utility program might allow it to
reduce its purchases from the wholesale markets. However, as
long as the state-sanctioned program did not involve bidding
into wholesale markets, FERC could not regulate it.104
Yet as the Court stated, FERC is not precluded from acting even if a state has taken steps to promote or regulate an
activity, as long as it does not interfere with matters expressly
reserved to the states under the FPA.105 While this would
96. Id.
97. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., 372 F.3d at 403.
98. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1824–33.
99. See generally Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector,
supra note 5; Rossi, supra note 6; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7.
100. Nor is this foreclosed by the text of the FPA itself. Rossi, supra note 6, at 45;
Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27 (“[T]o the extent the FPA does not
expressly foreclose it, the statute authorizes both federal and state regulators to
regulate the same activities in energy markets.”).
101. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5,
at 8.
102. FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779; Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 18
(“Post-EPSA, states have a range of options to further DR’s growth.”).
103. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5,
at 8.
104. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“If a retail customer forgoing energy
consumption does not choose to bid into wholesale demand response markets,
it simply is not subject to FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.”).
105. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1828 (“FERC’s authority extends to requiring power transmission planning
and cost allocation methods, notwithstanding traditional state authority over
transmission siting, because Order 1000 did not expressly intrude on states’
authority to approve individual transmission lines.”).
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seem to wall off certain activities for exclusive state action,
actions by FERC will narrow state choices. Upholding
FERC’s regional capacity models and transmission planning,
for example, constrains the states’ ability to plan for and
build new infrastructure.106 This contemplation of simultaneous action, and potential intersection between policies of
the two levels of government, consigns dual federalism in
electricity law to the dustbin of history.107

C.

Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing

FERC v. EPSA did not address how far the states could go
in influencing the grid’s future direction, when their actions
might impact the wholesale markets. This issue arose in
Hughes in the context of a Maryland law that provided incentives for a new power plant to locate in the state.108 The state
tied its incentive to prices in the capacity market that the PJM
regional transmission organization, the grid operator in the
region that includes Maryland, has operated since 2007.109
Capacity markets came into existence when regional planners recognized that electricity market prices alone would
not prompt construction of new power plants.110 The PJM
capacity market, known as the “Reliability Pricing Model,”111
is designed to provide additional payments to generators that
commit to sell power into PJM over the next three years.
PJM requires112 load-serving entities (“LSEs,” the term for
utilities and retail suppliers that serve customers)113 to purchase capacity in its Base Residual Auctions, which are conducted three years in advance of a designated delivery year.114
Maryland officials believed the payments to generators
from these auctions were insufficient to induce construction
of new power plants in the state.115 The resulting state law
106. Nordhaus, supra note 7, at 211 (noting that the Fourth and Third Circuits’
decisions on the Maryland and New Jersey programs “go far beyond excluding ‘subsidized’ resources from capacity markets—they bar their construction
and operation altogether”); cf. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Util. Control v. FERC,
569 F.3d 477 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (upholding FERC approval of the ISO-New
England capacity market under FERC’s “practice affecting rates” authority,
notwithstanding its impacts on states, given that it did not directly call for
construction of a specific power plant).
107. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5,
at 9.
108. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
109. Joseph Bowring, Capacity Markets in PJM, 2 Econ. Energy & Envtl. Pol’y
47, 50 (2013).
110. Id.
111. Capacity Market (RPM), PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://www.pjm.
com/markets-and-operations/rpm.aspx (last visited May 11, 2016).
112. The requirement to purchase capacity is known as the “capacity obligation.”
RPM Base Residual Auction FAQs, PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://www.
pjm.com/~/media/markets-ops/rpm/rpm-auction-info/rpm-base-residualauction-faqs.ashx (last visited May 11, 2016).
113. A “load-serving entity” is an entity that “[s]ecures energy and transmission
service (and related interconnected operations services) to serve the electrical
demand and energy requirements of its end-use customers.” Appendix 5B Statement of Compliance Registry Criteria, N. Am. Elec. Reliability Corp. 6 (Mar.
19, 2015), http://www.nerc.com/FilingsOrders/us/RuleOfProcedureDL/
Appendix_5B_RegistrationCriteria_20150319.pdf.
114. Supply can include “new generators, upgrades for existing generators, demand
response (consumers reducing electricity use in exchange for payment) energy efficiency and transmission upgrades.” Learning Center, Capacity Market
(RPM), PJM Interconnection, LLC, http://learn.pjm.com/three-priorities/
buying-and-selling-energy/capacity-markets.aspx (last visited May 11, 2016).
115. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1290.
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created a “contract for differences” between the winning bidder and LSEs.116 If the contract price exceeded the capacity market price, LSEs would pay the difference to the plant
owner.117 Because PJM’s capacity obligation requirement
already obligates LSEs to purchase capacity for the demand
they serve, paying the incremental difference under Maryland law as well would leave the LSEs paying a premium
above the market price.118
A group of challengers claimed this interfered with pricing
in the wholesale markets, and the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals agreed.119 It found that the doctrine of field preemption applied, concluding that FERC’s regulation of wholesale
markets under the FPA is so all-encompassing that it left no
room for the Maryland state law.120 As Hughes reached the
Court, observers believed that the Court should find an alternative to the appellate court’s field preemption approach.121
If that approach were upheld, FERC could void all state initiatives that might impact the wholesale markets, no matter
how substantial the impacts and how legitimate the states’
goals.122 That is too imbalanced and blunt an instrument to
govern the federal-state relationship,123 as FERC v. EPSA had
made clear that states have significant authority over matters
affecting the electric grid. Given the judicial presumption
against preemption in these mixed jurisdictional settings,124
applying field preemption in Hughes seemed unwise. Finally,
FERC was not a party in Hughes, and therefore invoked the
preemption issue only in an amicus brief. This could have
led the Court to the same restraint it used in ONEOK. Or
it could have used the primary jurisdiction doctrine,125 and
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 8 n.5 (providing hypothetical examples with sample calculations).
119. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub
nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg. LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). The Third
Circuit struck down a similar New Jersey law in PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
120. Nazarian, 753 F.3d at 475 (citing N. Natural Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n,
372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963) (“Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy
an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement
federal law.”)).
121. Robin Bravender, Supreme Court to Hear Major Grid Case Without Scalia, E&E
Publishing, LLC: Greenwire, Feb. 22, 2016 (quoting the author and Matthew Christiansen of the NYU Guarini Center). As Jim Rossi has cogently
observed, the difference might not have mattered. The ultimate analysis would
be similar in any event because “any energy field preemption issues under these
statutes ultimately depends on first assessing the issue as an obstacle or conflict
preemption case.” Rossi, supra note 6, at 54.
122. Bravender, supra note 121 (quoting the author for the proposition that, in
Hughes, “say[ing] that the state program is broadly pre-empted ‘would appear
to give FERC complete authority over the wholesale markets, and that would
be inconsistent’ with the demand-response ruling”); cf. Rossi, supra note 6,
at 54; Rossi & Hutton, supra note 57, at 1355 (recommending against field
preemption generally for electricity law and noting that “judicial decisions
seem to disfavor field preemption based on the mere possibility of federal
regulation as an overbroad approach that is inconsistent with any recognition
of state autonomy”).
123. Rossi, supra note 6, at 54.
124. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (“[W]here (as here) a state law can be applied to
non-jurisdictional as well as jurisdictional sales, we must proceed cautiously,
finding pre-emption only where detailed examination convinces us that a matter falls within the pre-empted field as defined by our precedents.”).
125. The primary jurisdiction doctrine is a judge-made tool that applies “when a
claim is cognizable in federal court but requires resolution of an issue of first
impression, or of a particularly complicated issue that Congress has committed
to a regulatory agency.” Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s
Erie Doctrine, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 997, 1026 (2007) (quoting Syntek Semi-
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not decided the case at all until FERC weighed in through a
regulation or other means.
Some believed the Court might adopt a conflict preemption approach.126 While Congressional purpose would again
have been the touchstone, a decision relying on conflict preemption might have allowed a range of state laws to stand.
The Court could also have expounded on the ONEOK test,
under which a state law is preempted if it is “aimed directly at
interstate purchasers and wholesales for resale.”127 There, the
Court focused on the state law’s regulatory scope: did it regulate businesses generally, or only the natural gas (or, by implication) electricity industry? As noted above, the ONEOK
Court distinguished examples of the former, such as antitrust
laws and securities blue sky laws, as “traditional” regulation
affecting “all businesses in the marketplace.”128 Under this
analysis, the Maryland law would fall, for it aimed as directly
as one can imagine at FERC-jurisdictional markets, affecting
only the amount the power plant owner receives from them.
But the use of other, more broad-based state laws to promote
power plant development would presumably be permissible.
Instead of doing any of this, the Court recited the basics
of preemption doctrine, but avoided crafting a sweeping
preemption principle or elaborating on the ONEOK test. It
issued a narrow decision that, like FERC v. EPSA, hewed
closely to the statutory text.129 The Court overturned the
Maryland law because it interfered with the system of setting wholesale rates through the capacity auctions.130 By
conditioning payment under the contract on the amount
the generator received in the wholesale market, the Maryland program took the market payment as an input and gave
the power plant owner the ability to change it. It allowed
the power plant owner to consider the subsidy and therefore
bid differently into the market, which, the Court stated,
would distort the market design and “disregard” the wholesale rate.131 Notwithstanding the Court’s rote enunciation of
preemption principles, this decision was grounded solely in
an interpretation of the FPA. This was evidenced in Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion stating that she agreed with
the majority decision on that basis.132
The Court also cautioned that it was only rejecting this
particular subsidy program:
Our holding is limited: We reject Maryland’s program only
because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate required
by FERC. We therefore need not and do not address the
permissibility of various other measures States might
employ to encourage development of new or clean generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies, construction of state-owned generation facilities, or
conductor Co. v. Microchip Tech. Inc., 285 F.3d 857, 862 (9th Cir. 2002)).
When a court employs this doctrine, it refers the matter to the agency and
may choose to retain jurisdiction while the agency makes a decision. Reiter v.
Cooper, 507 U.S. 258, 268 (1993).
126. See, e.g., Bravender, supra note 121.
127. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1600.
128. Id. at 1600–01.
129. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1294, 1299.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 1299.
132. Id. at 1299–1301 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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re-regulation of the energy sector. Nothing in this opinion should be read to foreclose Maryland and other States
from encouraging production of new or clean generation
through measures “untethered to a generator’s wholesale
market participation.” So long as a State does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the auction, the
State’s program would not suffer from the fatal defect that
renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.133

This shows the Justices’ concern about inhibiting states
from pursuing the wide variety of means they have at their
disposal for pursuing legitimate state goals such as encouraging new clean energy development. At the same time, if the
state were to “condition” the incentive on market payments,
or the measure is otherwise “tethered” to wholesale rates,
the initiative cannot stand.134 As Part III will discuss,135 this
leaves considerable uncertainty going forward.

II.

FERC Authority in a System of
Concurrent Jurisdiction

FERC v. EPSA’s grant of authority to FERC to regulate
“practices” “directly affecting” wholesale rates signals a
momentous shift in the arc of electricity law. As this Part will
demonstrate, it has far-reaching implications going forward.
This jurisdictional standard gives FERC considerable leeway
to regulate innovative activities taking place on the electric
grid, as long as it can demonstrate direct impacts on the
wholesale markets.136 Many situations, like demand response
bid into wholesale markets, will involve activities that have
impacts at both the wholesale and retail levels. This is no
longer a bar to action by FERC. FERC’s authority will turn
on the character of the activity and its impacts on wholesale
markets, not a formalistic assessment of whether the activity
is “wholesale” or “retail” in nature.137
After FERC v. EPSA, the states and FERC have dual
and concurrent roles to pursue electricity initiatives that
might reinforce each other’s actions.138 As Professor Jim
Rossi and former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff, who
led FERC’s development of Order 745, have stated, “[s]tate133. Id. at 1299.
134. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
135. See discussion infra Part III.
136. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note
5, at 8; Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra
note 25, at 1834 (demonstrating that FERC could justify a carbon price in
the wholesale markets under this authority); see also Christopher J. Bateman
& James T.B. Tripp, Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry,
38 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 276, 329–32 (2014) (claiming that the FPA authorizes FERC to set “social-cost wholesale rates” that incorporate environmental costs).
137. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 102 (terming this a “deeply functionalist and
pragmatic approach to the FPA”).
138. With respect to this contemplation of concurrent actions in demand response,
see Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note
5, at 8; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“This ‘opt out’ option allows
FERC to set basic expectations for demand response resources in wholesale
markets without discouraging state regulators from experimenting with a wide
range of complementary approaches to promote energy conservation.”); see also
Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 16 (“[T]here is no longer any lingering uncertainty about the dual rights of FERC and the states to continue to develop
policies that encourage DR.”).
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led policy experimentation with customer energy resources
is consistent with the basic jurisdictional principles FERC
endorsed in its regulation of demand response.”139 Much
post-EPSA commentary uses language like “adjacent,”
“complementary” and “experimentation” to describe this
new policy environment.140
Let a thousand flowers bloom, this suggests. And optimism can be the watchword of the moment, because FERC v.
EPSA did not require FERC to override specific state laws. In
FERC v. EPSA, FERC’s primary opponents were power generators, who objected to competition in the wholesale markets
from demand-side participation. States split on Order 745;
while some objected, some supported it.141 As a result, the
Court upheld FERC’s authority against EPSA’s arguments,
while simultaneously supporting state demand response programs. Even Hughes, where the Court rejected the Maryland
law, nodded to states’ flexibility by listing actions the Court
believed states could take.142
However, the potential for conflict will not remain in the
shadows for long. One of FERC v. EPSA’s most significant
contributions to electricity law is its endorsement of a dual
role for end users of electricity. They can act simultaneously
both as consumers and providers of resources to the electric
grid.143 As two state public utility Commissioners recently
noted, this empowers FERC to expand consumer participation in the wholesale markets.144 That is wholly within
FERC’s authority, even if it brings FERC into areas where the
states have previously acted alone. As Rossi and Wellinghoff
put it, “it is inevitable that FERC’s jurisdiction will expand
into some arenas state regulators once considered exclusively
their own.”145
And once that happens, solicitude for the states will
only extend so far. Under FERC v. EPSA, FERC has plenary authority over the wholesale markets’ structure and
operation,146 so a state cannot dictate the mechanics of market operations. Thus, deciding who may be a market par139. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28.
140. See generally Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5; Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note
7; cf. William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Rate Design and
Policy Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 810, 841–76 (2016)
(discussing numerous state experiments in the electric grid).
141. Nine states filed an amicus brief jointly in opposition to Order 745. Brief
Amici Curiae of North Carolina Utilities Commission et al., FERC v. Elec.
Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). Twelve more joined
another brief in opposition. Brief of Indiana, Oklahoma, and Ten States as
Amici Curiae in Support of the Respondents, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n,
136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840). Illinois, Maryland, Pennsylvania, and
several other states supported FERC, as did various state administrative agencies. Brief for the State of Illinois et al. as Amici Curiae, FERC v. Elec. Pwr.
Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No. 14-840); Joint States’ Reply Brief
on the Merits, FERC v. Elec. Pwr. Supply Ass’n, 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016) (No.
14-840).
142. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1298–99.
143. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, supra note 5,
at 7.
144. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 14 (noting that FERC v. EPSA “reinforces
FERC’s authority to ensure that any reliance on markets as a substitute for traditional cost-of-service regulation should employ market designs that promote
greater participation in the wholesale marketplace”).
145. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 27.
146. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1832; see also FERC v. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 774.
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ticipant is exclusively within FERC’s purview.147 Suppose a
state were to prohibit all generators making electricity from
wind from selling into the wholesale markets. That prohibition would fall.148 Order 745 included a similar provision:
a state could bar demand response firms from taking part
in wholesale markets. While the Court noted this provision,
it did not take the additional step of requiring it in Order
745 or any other initiative expanding wholesale market participation.149 Suppose, for example, that states chose to block
firms from selling demand response into wholesale markets,
which Order 745 allows. And further suppose that FERC
decided to promulgate a new rule that eliminated the veto.
If, as a result of these barriers, it found undue discrimination remained to market participation of demand response,
FERC’s rule would survive scrutiny.150
What could FERC do next? This Part will discuss two
examples of how boldly FERC could use the “directly affecting” authority to craft policies for integrating clean and
renewable energy into the electric grid, with environmental
benefits such as reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The first
involves a hypothetical nationwide extension of the proposal
by California’s regional grid operator to integrate DERs
into wholesale markets. DERs are the small-scale resources
on the customer side of the electric system, such as rooftop
solar, energy storage, plug-in electric vehicles, and demand
response.151 The second involves the New York proposal
under its “Reforming the Energy Vision” (REV proceeding152
to create DSPPs) to coordinate activities involving aggregation of DERs and administration of markets for matching
buyers and sellers of DERs.
Both proposals involve the intersection of state and federal
jurisdiction, even under pre-2015 jurisprudence. For example,
California contemplates that aggregators of DERs will sell
these resources into the wholesale markets, which would be
within FERC’s jurisdiction. New York DSPPs will continue
to purchase and sell electricity in the New York Independent
System Operator (“NYISO”) wholesale markets. But, as this
Part will demonstrate, FERC’s “directly affecting” authority
extends its reach beyond jurisdiction over wholesale transactions, to shaping or even requiring specific policy designs.
FERC has considerable latitude to use the “directly affect147. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority to Transform the Electric Grid, supra note 25,
at 1834.
148. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 29.
149. Id. at 30 (“[T]he Court did not conclude that state veto option is required
by the FPA or necessary to support any federal regulation of state barriers to
demand response as a practice affecting wholesale markets.”).
150. Id.; Alfred Kahn, The Supreme Court Saves Demand Response: Now What?,
Scott Hempling, Attorney at Law (Feb. 2016), http://www.scotthemplinglaw.com/essays/the-supreme-court-saves-demand-response (concluding
that “FERC . . . is free to remove the state veto.”).
151. Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp., Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, No. ER16-1085-000 app. C at 2 (Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter CAISO
Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative], https://www.caiso.com/Documents/Mar4_2016_TariffAmendment_DistributedEnergyResourceProvider_
ER16-1085.pdf. For a general discussion of DERs, see Distributed Energy Resources, Electric Power Res. Inst., http://www.epri.com/Our-Work/Pages/
Distributed-Electricity-Resources.aspx (last visited May 12, 2016).
152. Reforming the Energy Vision, N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv. (Jan. 28, 2016, 3:52
PM), http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/CC4F2EFA3A23551585
257DEA007DCFE2?OpenDocument.
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ing” authority to influence policy development, particularly
if it perceives that state laws stand in the way of just and
reasonable wholesale rates. The challenge is to balance its
authority over the wholesale markets with the states’ spirit
of innovation.

A.

Promoting Renewables in Wholesale Markets:
The Example of the California ISO “Distributed
Energy Resources Provider” Proposal

As an example of how a jurisdictional dialogue might arise,
suppose that FERC used the “directly affecting” standard to
allow consumers to sell other resources into wholesale markets, including electricity generated from small-scale facilities such as rooftop solar arrays. At present, wholesale market
structures create barriers to doing so.153 For example, a rooftop solar owner could not bid his excess electricity into any
wholesale market, due to size limits on market participants
and other restrictions.154
To remedy this situation, FERC need not invent a model.
Instead, it could rely on a system that the California regional
grid operator is already developing. The California ISO
(“CAISO”) submitted a “Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative” proposal to FERC in March 2016.155 This
proposal aims to reduce or eliminate barriers to DER integration in the regional grid. CAISO proposes the creation of
a “distributed energy resource provider” (“DERP”), which
would be an entire “new type of market resource similar to a
generating facility.”156 A DERP would aggregate mixtures of
DERs and sell them into the wholesale markets in amounts
sufficient to meet CAISO’s minimum size requirement.157
Either acting alone or through a contractor, a DERP would
handle details such as scheduling and bidding, and metering
and communication with DERs.158

153. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 1
(noting that “[c]urrently, the CAISO tariff does not offer a clear platform or
guidance for smaller distributed energy resources to participate effectively in
CAISO markets”). Each RTO imposes its own minimum sizes for participation. For example, ISO-New England has a minimum generator size of 5 megawatts (“MW”). ISO New England, Manual for Market Rule 1, III.3.2.6,
http://www.iso-ne.com/static-assets/documents/2014/12/mr1_sec_1_12.pdf.
For discussions of minimum bids for specific resources and markets, see James
F. Ellison et al., Project Report: A Survey of Operating Reserve Markets in U.S. ISO/RTO-Managed Electric Energy Regions, Sandia Nat’l
Lab. 18 (2012), http://www.sandia.gov/ess/publications/SAND2012_1000.
pdf (discussing requirement of continuous output for some specified duration
of time to be a provider), and Chris Neme & Richard Cowart, Energy Efficiency Participation in Electricity Capacity Markets—The US Experience 5 (2014) (ISO-New England and PJM minimum bid sizes for energy
efficiency project bids into capacity markets).
154. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 2
(“For instance, in order for traditional supply resources to participate in the
CAISO markets, they must meet the CAISO’s minimum size requirement of
0.5 MW. This same requirement applies to distributed energy resources that
wish to participate in the CAISO’s markets.”).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 3; Jeff St. John, California’s Plan to Turn Distributed Energy Resources Into
Grid Market Players, Greentech Media (June 12, 2015), http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/californias-plan-to-turn-distributed-energyresources-into-grid-market-play.
157. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151, at 2.
158. Id. at 8. The term for this function in CAISO is “scheduling coordinator.”
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DER aggregation could take a wide variety of forms,
including microgrids, small-scale facilities aggregated by new
market entrants, or even resources controlled by incumbent
utilities.159 The broad definition of DERs could dramatically
expand the types and amounts of distributed resources in
CAISO’s wholesale markets, create new classes of grid participants, and stimulate market competition.160 A wide variety of firms—electric vehicle charging stations, demand
response companies, home automation firms, and partnerships between battery storage and solar leasing companies—
have expressed interest in the California proposal.161
Because DERPs would sell DERs into CAISO’s wholesale markets, the California proposal required FERC’s
approval. In spring 2016, it submitted a tariff amendment to
FERC describing numerous program features, which FERC
approved in June 2016.162 Now suppose that California has
administered the program and gained experience with it.
Then, further suppose that FERC believed the California
program was successful and issued a rule that required other
regions to adopt DER aggregation. The potential implications are staggering: in a multi-state region, DER aggregation would allow a consumer with excess solar power to sell it
to consumers many miles away in a different state.
To the extent it would be implemented by third party
aggregators, the DERP structure is functionally similar to
the aggregation mechanism FERC v. EPSA approved for bidding demand response into wholesale markets. And bids of
electricity from distributed generation facilities would have
impacts on wholesale market rates as direct as bidding in
demand response. Adding new resources to a regional electricity mix would change wholesale prices, much as demand
response lowered prices directly at times of peak demand.163
Thus, adding more DERs to wholesale markets would
directly affect wholesale rates and FERC would be acting
well within its authority under the “directly affecting” standard if it required expanded DER aggregation.
As a predicate to this action, FERC would need to find
that there had been undue discrimination against participation of these resources in wholesale markets.164 This requirement could be satisfied in a number of ways. These could
include reference to the size restrictions on wholesale market participation mentioned above. FERC could also take
159. Id. at 5; cf. Jeff St. John, Texas Moving Into Real-World Proposal Stage for Distributed Energy-Grid Integration, Greentech Media (May 6, 2016), http://www.
greentechmedia.com/articles/read/Texas-Moving-Into-Real-World-ProposalStage-For-Distributed-Energy-Grid-Int (describing the proposal of the ERCOT system operator in Texas to allow DER bidding into wholesale markets,
with contemplation of an aggregation structure left to future proceedings).
ERCOT is not subject to FERC’s authority, as it is located wholly within Texas
and not connected to the rest of the nation’s grid. See ERCOT, Fed. Energy
Reg. Comm’n (Nov. 17, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indusact/rto/ercot.asp.
160. Order Accepting Proposed Tariff Revisions Subject to Condition, June 2, 2016,
https://www.ferc.gov/CalendarFiles/20160602164336-ER16-1085-000.pdf.
161. St. John, supra note 156.
162. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative, supra note 151.
163. Id. at 24–25 (noting that DERs on the CAISO system will impact prices
through reducing transmission congestion, among other benefits).
164. 16 U.S.C. § 824e (2012) (requiring FERC to find the “rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential”); Rossi, supra note 6, at 57.
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note of the actions currently underway in many states to
limit consumers’ ability to provide energy back to the grid
through net metering or other means,165 or to choose innovative financing models for rooftop solar power such as power
purchase agreements.166
If FERC found that state laws limiting renewable energy
development posed barriers to the participation of small-scale
resources, and thus to the ability of the wholesale markets
to provide just and reasonable rates, FERC could act under
its “practices affecting rates” authority. It would be asserting that these laws directly affected wholesale rates by limiting market participation of DERs. And it could take action,
even without incorporating a state veto into its rule. To avoid
jurisdictional friction and potential political resistance, it
could develop a nationwide program in consultation with the
states. Perhaps that would be the wisest course of action, but
after FERC v. EPSA, it is no longer strictly necessary.

B.

Impacting End Users: Influencing Development of
the Distribution System Operator Concept

FERC could also influence a dramatic transformation contemplated by the New York Public Service Commission
(“PSC”) in its REV proceeding, which proposes significant
regulatory changes to make the state’s electric system cleaner,
more resilient, and more affordable.167 One of REV’s central
features is a comprehensive transformation of distribution
level utilities into distribution system operators (“DSOs”).
This concept has been widely promoted in recent years in
Europe168 and the United States.169 Broadly speaking, the
DSO concept involves utilities moving away from simply
serving customers via their existing distribution infrastruc165. See generally NC Clean Energy Tech. Ctr., 50 States of Solar: Q1 2016
Quarterly Report (2016), https://nccleantech.ncsu.edu/wp-content/
uploads/50-SoS-Q1-2016_Final.pdf (identifying how states are limiting policies promoting solar energy). An example is Nevada’s law rolling back its net
metering incentive. Julia Pyper, Does Nevada’s Controversial Net Metering Decision Set a Precedent for the Nation?, Greentech Media (Feb. 4, 2016), http://
www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/nevada-net-metering-decision.
For
discussions of impediments to renewable energy development generally, see
Joel B. Eisen, Residential Renewable Energy: By Whom?, 31 Utah Envtl. L.
Rev. 339 (2011), and Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 Ecology L.Q. 903 (2011).
166. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 30, 31 (“Under current FERC policies,
some states similarly limit retail customers from providing excess energy from
rooftop solar or energy storage to the grid, and some of these state barriers
could similarly go too far . . . . FERC can act when ‘a state’s regulatory prohibition on new entrants serves no purpose but benefitting incumbents while
threatening competitive wholesale markets (as some state limits on third-party
solar providers may).’”).
167. Reforming the Energy Vision, supra note 152.
168. Development of Methodologies and Tools for New and Evolving DSO Roles for
Efficient DRES Integration in Distribution Networks, European Commission:
Cmty. Res. & Dev. Info. Serv., http://cordis.europa.eu/project/rcn/109548_
en.html (last updated Mar. 31, 2016) (containing research and reports of the
“evolvDSO” consortium).
169. Lorenzo Kristov & Paul De Martini, 21st Century Electric Distribution System
Operations (May, 2014), http://resnick.caltech.edu/docs/21st.pdf (discussing
an “integrated distributed electricity system” that would perform this function, featuring DSOs) [hereinafter Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution
System Operation]; Jeremy Lin & Katarina Knezović, 2016 13th Int’l Conf.
on the European Energy Mkt. (EEM) (June 6–9, 2016); James Tong & Jon
Wellinghoff, Rooftop Parity, Fort., Aug. 2014, https://www.fortnightly.com/
fortnightly/2014/08/rooftop-parity (proposing DSOs).
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ture, to becoming system operators responsible for planning
and operations of the distribution network. The New York
REV would implement the DSO concept by turning utilities
in the state into DSPPs.170
A central goal of most DSO discussions is to facilitate
more widespread integration of DERs into the grid, particularly from new grid participants.171 The New York DSPP
proposal, for example, is intended “to reform the utility business model and practices so that planning for and integrating DERs from third party providers is a central focus.”172
This recognizes that DERs are proliferating, but are primarily owned by customers (as in rooftop solar) or third parties,
so distribution utilities often do not take them into account
in system planning efforts.173 A DSO would enhance integration of DERs through promoting revised business models and conducting markets for distribution-level electricity
resources in which DERs would participate.174 A DSO could
be an existing distribution utility or, as some propose, a new
independent entity.175

1.

Key Attributes of the DSO

Discussions of the concept envision that a DSO would conduct some or all of a wide variety of activities. One recent

170. New York’s Public Service Commission split the REV proceeding into two
tracks, with Track One focusing on DERs, distribution level markets, and the
DSPP concept. Track 2 focuses on reforming utility ratemaking practices to
reflect the DSPP model. The PSC’s Track One order of February 2015 elaborated on the DSPP concept. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting Regulatory Policy Framework and Implementation Plan, 14-M-0101, at 12 (Feb.
26, 2015) [hereinafter N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order].
171. Herman K. Trabish, Jon Wellinghoff: Utilities Should Not Operate the Distribution Grid, Utility Dive, Aug. 15, 2014, http://www.utilitydive.com/news/
jon-wellinghoff-utilities-should-not-operate-the-distribution-grid/298286/;
Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 1; see also Kristov & De Martini, supra note 169, at 1 (discussing an “integrated distributed electricity system” that would perform this function, featuring DSOs).
172. Gavin Bade, REV in 2016: The Year That Could Transform Utility Business Models in New York, Utility Dive, Jan. 20, 2016, http://www.utilitydive.com/
news/rev-in-2016-the-year-that-could-transform-utility-business-models-innew-y/412410/.
173. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 1 (“Up until now, there has been limited incorporation of distributed energy resources (DER), demand response (DR), energy storage (DESS) and
energy efficiency (EE) into the distribution system planning efforts.”); Tong
& Wellinghoff, supra note 169 (stating that for this reason DERs “are not incorporated into the utility’s resource planning mix”). Some utilities have begun
programs to develop (or procure) and own DERs. See, e.g., Ian Clover, SDG&E
Signs 20 MW Storage Contract, PV Mag., Apr. 1, 2016 (describing procurement by San Diego Gas & Electric of storage).
174. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 1; Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 169. But see Kristov & De Martini, supra
note 169, at 6 (noting that the DSO should not administer economic markets
but should instead act as an interface with the wholesale markets).
175. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 3 (calling for independence as a DSO core attribute); Tong & Wellinghoff,
supra note 169 (“[W]e contend that the best way for a utility to embrace new
innovations without disruption to the grid is to have the distribution utilities transfer their operations to an independent distribution system operator
(IDSO)”). The New York PSC considered a REV design with independent
DSPPs, but concluded that, “because the DSP core functions would be highly
integrated with utility planning and system operations, assigning them to an
independent party would be redundant, inefficient and unnecessarily costly.”
N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 45–46.
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report identifies numerous key attributes of a DSO.176 Among
others, these include the following:

(a) Operational Flexibility
Regional grid operators dispatch power plants to utilities
and load-serving entities that serve end users.177 In similar
fashion, a DSO could serve as a retail-level dispatcher. In
this capacity, much as an RTO does at the regional level, it
would be “akin to an air traffic controller.”178 It would balance supply and demand at the distribution level with a wide
variety of electricity resources, including traditional power
plants and an expanded fleet of DERs. Once a significant
amount of DERs are connected directly to the DSO, this
would require a system with the flexibility to manage all of
these resources and simultaneously balance real-time supply
and demand. For example, the DSO would need physical
tools intelligently designed to allow for two-way power flow
among multiple nodes on the system.179

(b) Market Administration
The DSO would be responsible for creating and administering markets, similar to the regional wholesale markets,
which would trade DERs provided by third parties.180 The
market structures would need to be designed to properly
value DERs and provide incentives for them to participate
and provide electricity in sufficient quantities. This would
also be an added means of contributing to system flexibility, by diversifying the portfolio of resources used to meet
demand.181 The DSO markets would be interconnected with
wholesale markets, and, under certain structural designs, the
DSO might be a wholesale market participant. For instance,
if it was “netting out the aggregates of resources and loads at
the distribution level,” it might purchase electricity from the
wholesale market.182
176. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 1–3; cf. Trabish, supra note 171 (identifying Jon Wellinghoff’s functions
for an IDSO). In former FERC Chairman Jon Wellinghoff’s view, the IDSO
would maintain system safety and reliability; provide open and transparent
system access; implement market mechanisms; oversee optimal DER deployment and dispatch; guard consumers’ access to all transactive energy services;
and allow regulated utilities, unregulated energy sellers, independent energy
and service providers, and electricity customers equal opportunity to meet new
electricity consumer needs.
177. Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 150.
178. Bade, supra note 172.
179. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 2.
180. Id. The New York Track One order calls for distribution-level markets. N.Y.
PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 33. New York aims to promote
fairness in these markets by generally prohibiting utilities from owning distributed energy resources. Id. at 41 (“[T]he DSP market structure must monetize
and exchange enhanced DER services in fair and open transactive markets[.]”);
id. at 68 (“As a general rule, utility ownership of DER will not be allowed unless markets have had an opportunity to provide a service and have failed to do
so in a cost-effective manner.”).
181. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 104 (“Utilities are responsible for reliability, and the functions needed to enable distributed markets are
integrally bound to the functions needed to ensure reliability.”).
182. Comparative Analysis of Flexible Distribution System Operation, supra note 169,
at 2.
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(c) Operational and Planning Authority
The DSO would assume responsibility for operating the
distribution system, matching supply and demand instantaneously, and maintaining this balance under a variety of
contingencies, including variable output from intermittent
DERs.183 The state’s design for the DSO might give responsibility for operating the system and the markets to two different entities, but it is more likely (as is the case with RTOs)
that a single entity would operate the distribution system and
the resource markets. And, like the RTOs’ responsibility for
planning for transmission adequacy, the DSO would plan for
expansions of the distribution network and of the network of
electricity resources available to serve end users.

(d) Open Non-Discriminatory Access
As at the regional level, the DSO design should incorporate
“provisions or rules that require open, fair and non-discriminatory access . . . by legitimate users of the system.”184 In this
respect, the DSO should allow utilities, DER owners, customers, independent energy and service providers and other
third parties the equal opportunity to meet the needs of end
users.185 This would require rules akin to FERC’s Order 888
that required open non-discriminatory access to the transmission grid.186

(e) Interface With the Regional Grid
Operator
Finally, besides balancing supply and demand variations at
the distribution level, the DSO would link with the regional
grid operator. As noted more fully below, this intersection is
complex, with many points of interaction.

2.

Jurisdictional Intersections in DSPP
Implementation in New York

Through the REV proceeding, New York is moving rapidly
to adopt the DSPP architecture, its variant of the DSO concept.187 In this proceeding, the state’s PSC is filling the role
that FERC does with respect to the wholesale markets. It
has taken on responsibility for design and implementation,
acting as a “market overseer, enforcer of market rules, and
creator of market structures[.]”188 Whatever form the final
DSPP structure will take, it will involve many avenues for
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Tong & Wellinghoff, supra note 169.
186. Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, Order No. 888, 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385
(1996); Regional Transmission Organizations, Order No. 2000, 18 C.F.R. pt.
35 (2000). For a discussion of these developments, see Joel B. Eisen, Regulatory
Linearity, Commerce Clause Brinksmanship, and Retrenchment in Electric Utility
Deregulation, 40 Wake Forest L. Rev. 545, 550–51 (2005).
187. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 3.
188. Trabish, supra note 171 (quoting Jon Wellinghoff’s explanation of role changes
of independent distribution system operators).
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state and federal jurisdiction to intersect.189 This section
analyzes three different areas of FERC’s potential authority:
jurisdiction over wholesale sales of electricity that would take
place in the new system; “directly affecting” jurisdiction over
DSPP market rules that the PSC will adopt by virtue of the
impacts on wholesale rates; and “directly affecting” jurisdiction over coordination activities between the wholesale and
distribution level markets required as a result of interposing
a distribution-level market structure between the wholesale
markets and end users.
In its “Track One” order in 2015, the PSC made a number
of key early decisions to guide design and implementation.
For example, it stated that incumbent distribution utilities (Consolidated Edison and National Grid, for example)
would serve as DSPPs in New York.190 Other issues, such as
the final design of distribution-level markets, are continuing to receive regulatory attention in the REV proceeding.
For example, the PSC contemplates that a DSPP would be
“a seamless interface between aggregated customers and the
NYISO.”191 Thus, the DSPP would fit between the regional
grid operator and end users. This creates many linkages and
requirements for coordination between the NYISO and the
DSPPs. Markets administered by DSPPs would have numerous overlaps with the wholesale markets.192 Any exchange of
electricity between the New York ISO (the state’s grid operator) and a DSPP would be a FERC-jurisdictional wholesale
transaction; it fits the FPA’s definition of a wholesale sale of
electricity as a sale for resale to an end user.193
So too might any sale by a DER owner in a DSPPadministered market. The analysis of this aspect of FERC’s
potential jurisdiction is much more complex, and, as no such
market yet exists, the exact nature of FERC’s authority will
depend on the precise market structure that the PSC selects.
However, there is some basis for drawing preliminary conclusions, as the process of developing New York’s distribution level markets is already underway. The Track One order
describes a multi-stage process of evolution toward open
DER markets,194 beginning with a near-term effort focused
189. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 109 (noting that, because “REV contemplates,
among other things, developing a state-level analog to the RTOs that operate
federal electricity markets,” it has “the potential to create exactly the sort of
“complex matter[s] that lie[ ] at the confluence of State and Federal jurisdiction” that FERC addressed with respect to demand response in Order 745.”).
190. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 46–53.
191. Id. at 12.
192. Id. at 12.
193. 16 U.S.C. § 824(d) (defining the “sale of electric energy at wholesale” as “a sale
of electric energy to any person for resale”); see also N.Y. PSC REV Track One
Order, supra note 170, at 27–28 (comments of NYISO that DSPPs “should be
subject to FERC regulation to the extent that [they] participate in wholesale
markets”); Frank J. Guarini Ctr. on Envtl., Energy & Land Use Law,
N.Y.U., Building New York’s Future Electricity Markets: Identifying
Policy Prerequisites & Market Relationships 10 (2015), http://guarinicenter.org/building-new-yorks-future-electricity-markets/.
194. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 33 (“Products, rules, and
entrants will develop in the market over time, and markets will value the attributes and capabilities of all types of technologies. As DSP capabilities evolve,
procurement of DER attributes will develop as well, from a near-term approach based on RFPs and load modifying tariffs, towards a potentially more
sophisticated auction approach. . . .”). The structure of the market will be a
function of the needs defined by the DSP and customers, the products available in the market and procurement mechanisms for those products, the identity and capabilities of market participants and their interactions among each
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on incorporating DERs through requests for proposals, and
“potentially” leading to an auction structure.195 Building on
that regulatory outline, an independent consultant jointly
retained by the DPS and New York State Energy Research
and Development Authority has recently produced a report
to be used as an input to the REV proceeding.196 This report
outlines the numerous parameters involved in the “design of
a new, distribution level market for energy and related electric products from [DERs] and of a statewide digital Platform to animate and facilitate the financial transactions in
that market.”197 The DSPPs would co-own the platform,
which would be a “business ecosystem” that would incorporate a forward market and a separate clearing market.198 The
paper concludes that a “Platform Market” “will best fulfill
the objectives of the Commission as articulated in its Framework Order,”199 but the analysis in this section includes the
important caveat that the platform structure may not be the
ultimate design chosen for DSPP markets.200
This “platform” is designed to resemble the structure used
by companies such as Uber and Airbnb that match buyers
and sellers and take a percentage fee.201 Thus, it defines a “core
interaction” that, like Uber’s pairings of drivers and prospective passengers, matches market participants with each other:
Parties can schedule delivery once parties complete the
exchange of information and reach an agreement. The
core interaction is completed, the parties have created and
exchanged value, and there is a settlement.202

The platform would have a wide variety of participants.203
These could include DER owners, DSPPs, energy service
companies (“ESCOs,” competitive electricity suppliers in
New York’s restructured electricity system204), third party
aggregators and brokers trading DERs, system developers and installers, other energy companies offering services
such as forecasting and analytics to consumers,205 and even
individual consumers participating directly. The platform’s
other and with the DSP, and policy guidance of the Commission. Customers
will realize the greatest benefits from open, animated markets that provide clear
signals—both long and short term—for benefits and costs of participants’ market activity.
195. Id.
196. See generally Richard Tabors et al., White Paper on Developing Competitive Electricity Markets and Pricing Structures, Tabors Caramanis Rudkevich (Apr.
2016), http://tcr-us.com/uploads/3/9/7/2/3972068/tcr_developing_competitive_electricity_markets_paper__appendices_2016.pdf.
197. Id. at ES-1.
198. Id. at ES-4.
199. Id. at 57.
200. The report states this explicitly. Id. at 50 (“The Commission will ultimately
decide whether to approve or reject the implementation of a platform and a
platform market.”).
201. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 45 (“[P]latforms that facilitate a monetary
transaction between buyers and sellers often try to monetize by charging a
transaction cut, i.e., a percentage of the actual transaction value.”).
202. Id. at 40.
203. Id. at 39.
204. What You Should Know Before Choosing an Energy Supplier, N.Y. Dep’t of Pub.
Serv., http://www3.dps.ny.gov/W/PSCWeb.nsf/All/DAA1CF3080DA35F68
5257FCB004EBB59?OpenDocument.
205. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 13 (using the example of “suppliers of smallscale energy management systems, such as the NEST thermostat and the Tesla
Storage Wall, to develop consumer-based Platform applications for those individual DER technologies”).
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multi-faceted structure would facilitate exchanges between
“producers,” who would be “typically the owners and aggregators of the DER who can use their assets to deliver part
or all of a core electric product,” and “consumers,” typically
DSPPs and ESCOs.206 There would also be a wide variety of
products exchanged, including “core products” like “energy
and operating reserves” and other products and services.207

then sold the electricity it purchased to end users, this
makes the original sales wholesale transactions. It would not
matter that the platform simply acts as the “agent” for the
seller and buyer. The first sales of DERs would be subject to
FERC jurisdiction.
Even if for some reason it could not assert its sale jurisdiction over transactions in the DSPP markets, FERC would
also have jurisdiction over the linkages between
Distribution Utility <==> DER Owner: Buy and sell Core Products to one another the DSPPs and NYISO under its “directly
ESCO <==> DER Owner: Buy and sell Core Products to one another (An interaffecting” authority. As one of many examples,
mediary could also transact on behalf of DER owners)
consider the close coordination between the two
levels of markets required under the REV proDistribution Utility ==> Sells prequalified leads to ESCOs
posal for demand response participation. New
Distribution Utility ==> Sells prequalified leads to DER system installers
York contemplates that if demand response is to
DER system installers ==> Sell systems to DER owners
participate more fully in wholesale markets via
ESCOs ==> Sell full service supplier service to DER owners/households
the DSPP, “[T]here will be a need for alignment
Value added service providers ==> Sell analytics support to ESCOs
of wholesale and retail market rules relating to
demand response aggregation, program eligibilValue added service providers ==> Sell analytics support to Distribution Utilities
ity, product valuation, payment protocols, comIn this platform, there would be many different types of
munications technology and procedures, and measurement
exchanges among buyers and sellers. Here, for example, is a
and verification methodologies.”212
matrix detailing the “range of transactions one could design
Such coordination will be necessary to fully realize the vala platform to support”208:
ues of distribution-level markets as well as to protect against
How much of this activity invokes FERC’s jurisdiction
risks of double payments. In some cases, this could require
over wholesale sales of electricity? The state believes “none
changes to wholesale market structures “to reflect [the] full
at all.” The Track One order spells out New York’s intent
value of services.”213 The consultant’s report describes an
to bypass FERC’s sale jurisdiction by providing that “utiliexample. At present, DER participation in NYISO markets
ties will not purchase power that would constitute a sale for
is limited. DERs do not take part in the energy market, and
resale.”209 However, suppose the PSC adopted a market struconly demand response can bid into the NYISO capacity
ture (as its report contemplates) in which DSPPs purchased
market.214 Demand response is further limited by restrictions
electricity from DERs and then sold it to their customers. In
that effectively preclude entities offering small-scale reducthat case, as New York City and other commenters pointed
tions from participation.215
this out to the PSC in comments in the REV proceeding, the
The report identifies the potential for the platform marsales in the market would be at wholesale.210 By comparison,
ket to circumvent these restrictions by allowing multiple
the platform’s designers take the view that its structure does
demand response sellers to “pool” their resources and act as
not involve purchases and sales because the platform merely
a single, larger source of reductions sufficient to bid into the
facilitates exchanges between buyers and sellers. Accordingly,
ICAP market.216 It states that the jurisdictional issues that
the report’s “understanding [is] that FERC may not interpret
this might raise are “outside the scope of this paper.”217 This
transactions in which the buyer acts as an agent of the seller,
is a tacit acknowledgement that this potential vehicle for
rather than holding title as a sale for resale.”211
increased demand response participation would raise FERCYet the broad FPA definition of “sale of electric energy
jurisdictional issues if NYISO needed to revise its demand
at wholesale” contains no such limitation: it encompasses
response bid rules to accommodate the changes at the dis“a sale of electric energy to any person for resale.” Consider
tribution level. FERC’s authority could also lead it to require
the first two categories in the table above: the sale of energy
or reserves (the “core products” defined above) from a DER
owner to a distribution utility or ESCO. If, after a transac212. N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., Developing the REV Market in New York: DPS
tion like this took place, the distribution utility or ESCO
Staff Straw Proposal on Track One Issues, 14-M-0101, at 34 (Aug. 22, 2014)
206. Id. at 39.
207. Id. at 40.
208. Id. at 59 tbl. 5 (Range of Possible Platform Transactions).
209. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 43 (“To avoid overlapping
jurisdiction over DSP activities, utilities will not purchase power that would
constitute a sale for resale under the Federal Power Act, except for purchases
that are otherwise required by law (e.g., the Public Utilities Regulatory Policies
Act and PSL Section 66-c).”).
210. Id. (“New York City and others cautioned that products purchased by DSPs
that are either repackaged for sale in ISO markets, or resold directly to utility
customers, could trigger jurisdiction of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) over DSP activities.”).
211. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 8 n.16.

(emphasis added); cf. CAISO Distributed Energy Resource Provider Initiative,
supra note 151, at 2 (noting that the California DERP initiative was designed
to “ensure that all aggregations are consistent with applicable rules and tariffs
at both the retail and wholesale levels”).
213. N.Y. PSC REV Track One Order, supra note 170, at 30.
214. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 27; ICAP Data and Information, N.Y. Indep. Sys.
Operator, http://www.nyiso.com/public/markets_operations/market_data/icap/
index.jsp.
215. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 27 (“[T]he maximum reduction a DER can
bid into the NYISO ICAP market is limited to the average coincident load
of its host facility; the DER cannot submit a bid in excess of its host’s average
coincident load.”).
216. Id.
217. Id.
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adjustments to DSPP market rules to align them with any
necessary changes to wholesale market operations.
In addition, FERC could exert influence over DSPP market rules because increased DER penetration would directly
impact wholesale market rates.218 Increased DER resources
trading in state markets could reduce the amount of electricity utilities purchased on the wholesale markets. As the
PSC’s consultant’s report states, “it is assumed that Distribution Utilities will begin, sooner or later, procuring electric
products from DER to . . . cost-effectively displace purchases
of energy, ancillary services, and capacity from the relevant
NYISO wholesale markets.”219 This would lead to “direct”
impacts on those wholesale markets, and under FERC v.
EPSA the potential for FERC to assert jurisdiction over certain DSPP market rules.
How this will all play out in the end is uncertain, as
the REV proceeding is not yet completed and many of its
features have yet to be finalized.220 The REV involves the
distribution system, jurisdiction over which the FPA traditionally reserves to the states. But this does not bar FERC’s
involvement.221 One can anticipate a number of potential
jurisdictional dialogues between FERC and New York.222
The PSC consultant’s report specified that New York might
use open access tariffs at the distribution level to establish
certain terms and conditions of DSPP operations.223 If the
state pursued this route, FERC could exercise oversight over
these tariffs through engagement in dialogues with the PSC.
Eventually, we might well see FERC adopt a generic “open
access distribution tariff” (“OADT”) specifying terms and
conditions for many different aspects of this interaction,
similar to the open access tariffs that govern access to the
nation’s transmission lines.224 If it approved of New York’s
experiments, it could base the OADT on lessons learned
from the REV proceeding.

III. State Jurisdiction After Hughes
Part II suggests that FERC v. EPSA could lead to jurisdictional challenges, and constraints on states’ flexibility, if
218. See Developing the REV Market in New York, supra note 212, at 33; cf. Varun
Sivaram, The Supreme Court Just Clarified Rules for Modern Power Regulation
. . . Or Did It?, Council on Foreign Rel., Energy, Sec’y & Climate (Jan.
26, 2016), http://blogs.cfr.org/levi/2016/01/26/the-supreme-court-just-clarified-rules-for-modern-power-regulationor-did-it/ (“[T]hese distribution-level
markets may very well meet the Court’s two part test in FERC of directly
affecting wholesale rates and indirectly affecting retail rates, triggering federal
jurisdiction over state initiatives.”).
219. Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 8.
220. Christiansen, supra note 5, at 109 (“The REV proceeding is ongoing and it is
impossible to say at this point what steps, if any, FERC might take to address
the jurisdictional quandaries that it may present.”).
221. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 28 (“To the extent that customer energy resource programs address distribution or generation facilities, the plain
language of section 201(b) of the FPA would appear to foreclose FERC from
regulating them at all. Beyond this express prohibition on the regulation of
certain facilities, FERC v. EPSA clarifies that FERC may still regulate wholesale
rates and practices that directly affect them.”).
222. Id. (“What is important for this Essay, however, is the fact that REV and other
state reforms are likely to create more of the jurisdictional challenges on display
in EPSA.”).
223. See Tabors et al., supra note 196, at 26.
224. See generally Eisen, An Open Access Distribution Tariff, supra note 19.
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FERC uses the “directly affecting” authority to undertake
a new initiative or coordinate with a state’s program. But
in Hughes, the spotlight shone on the states, and their flexibility to promote new power plants. What constrains the
states in pursuing their goals in the electric grid, whether
they are related to reliability, promoting clean energy, or
other objectives?
The Hughes Court eschewed developing a precise standard, refraining from declaring ab initio which states’ efforts
would be precluded. Under the narrowest interpretation of
Hughes, one type of state initiative is barred: an initiative or
subsidy with a direct effect on wholesale prices in a FERCapproved wholesale capacity market.225 Maryland’s program
operated by making a direct adjustment to the compensation paid to the generator in the PJM capacity market, so
any other state incentive so closely tied to expected market
revenues would be similarly suspect.226 The Court itself recognized this shortly after deciding Hughes in refusing to hear
an appeal of a Third Circuit decision voiding a comparable
New Jersey law.227
What other state policies might survive judicial scrutiny?
This Part uses two examples to consider possible answers. One
is a hypothetical state property tax incentive, as recognized
by the Court in Hughes. The other is New York’s proposal
to incorporate within its Clean Energy Standard program a
“Zero Emissions Credit” (“ZEC”) mechanism.228 The ZEC
program is designed to support nuclear power plants that are
“struggling to stay in business because the market clearing
prices do not cover long-run average costs.”229
These examples demonstrate that the laundry list of state
initiatives the Court appears to endorse at the end of the
Hughes majority opinion probably raises more questions than
it answers. As Professor Emily Hammond recently observed,
“The difficulty is that Hughes doesn’t really tell us which state
initiatives will survive future Supremacy Clause challenges,
and which will fail.”230

A.

“Broad-Based” Policies: The Example of Tax
Incentives

Under Hughes, states have considerable latitude to subsidize
new generation. As in ONEOK, the Hughes Court divided
state and local policies into two categories: those explicitly
225. An LSE can still find other ways to meet the capacity obligation, either through
self-supply or bilateral contracts. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299; Brief for the
Respondents, at 40, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288
(2016) (No. 14-614) (explaining how the “fixed resource requirement” option in PJM allows LSEs these options); cf. Jeannine Anderson, FERC Upholds
Exemption for Self-Supply in PJM Capacity Market, Pub. Pwr. Daily, Oct. 29,
2015 (describing the FERC order exempting entities that self-supply from the
PJM minimum offer price rule).
226. Emily Hammond, Hughes v. Talen Energy Marketing, LLC: Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, Geo. Wash. L. Rev. Docket (Oct. 2015),
http://www.gwlr.org/hughes-v-talen-energy-marketing-llc-energy-laws-juris
dictional-boundaries-take-three/.
227. Jeannie O’Sullivan, High Court Won’t Hear NJ Power Plant Subsidy Appeals,
Law360, Apr. 25, 2016.
228. N.Y. Dep’t of Pub. Serv., Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, 15-E0302, at 6 (Jan. 2016).
229. Hammond, supra note 226, at 3.
230. Id. at 4.
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designed to influence the wholesale markets, and “various
other measures.
States might employ to encourage development of new or
clean generation.”231 The Court appeared to sanction the latter category, as it provided that states “may regulate within
the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws
incidentally affect areas within FERC’s domain.”232 Yet the
Court’s mention of “tax incentives, land grants, [and] direct
subsidies”233 (among others) as programs that would appear
to pass muster leaves important questions unanswered, and
much uncertainty for the future.
To begin with, the Court did not specifically approve
this laundry list. It stated only that “we need not and do
not address” whether these incentives would be allowed.234
This leaves future courts to grapple with a number of vexing
issues. Maryland’s law was invalid for two separate reasons.
It “aimed directly” at the wholesale markets with an initiative
that regulated only electricity generators that participated in
the wholesale markets, not industries at large. And it based
the subsidy level explicitly on wholesale market price signals.
Which of these (or both?) is the “tether” the Court had in
mind? That is, could a state provide any economic incentive
targeted to a would-be power plant developer, as long as it
only incidentally affected the wholesale markets and was not
calculated based on market prices?
The answer is complex, as the example of tax incentives
demonstrates. States use a wide variety of tax policies to
promote business development,235 to varying effect.236 Virginia, for example, has dozens of categories and individual
programs, including property tax exemptions, enterprise
zone programs, job tax credits, and many others.237 Many
target specific industries. For example, Virginia offers a tax
exemption for certain manufacturers’ generating and cogeneration equipment used to improve energy efficiency in specific ways,238 and a “Green Job Creation Tax Credit” that
231. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
232. Id. at 1290.
233. Id. at 1299.
234. Id.; see Jeannie O’Sullivan, High Court Leaves NJ Power Plant Hopes Dimmed
But Not Out, Law360, Apr. 21, 2016 (quoting Day Pitney LLP partner David
T. Doot).
235. Pew Ctr. on the States, Evidence Counts: Evaluating State Tax Incentives for Jobs
and Growth (2012) (discussing numerous incentives, and evaluating the effectiveness of states’ efforts to produce metrics for evaluating them).
236. There is extensive literature criticizing the use of state tax incentives as a business development mechanism. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 Harv. L. Rev.
1573, 1644 (2000) (“All the evidence points to a single conclusion: state tax
incentives are a thoroughly unproven tool for promoting economic development.”); Inst. on Taxation and Econ. Pol’y, Tax Incentives: Costly for States,
Drag on the Nation (2013) (claiming that “tax incentives are of little benefit
to the states and localities that offer them, and that they are actually a drag on
national economic growth”).
237. Va. Econ. Dev. P’ship, Va. Guide to Bus. Incentives 7 (2014–2015),
http://www.yesvirginia.org/Content/pdf/Library/2014-2015%20Guide%20
to%20Incentives.pdf.
238. Va. Code Ann. § 58.1-3506(A)(9) (West 2016). This
This statutory provision establishes a separate category of personal property for generating equipment,
which localities may exempt from taxation, that is used “for the purpose of
changing the energy source of a manufacturing plant from oil or natural gas to
coal, wood, wood bark, wood residue, or any other alternative energy source
for use in manufacturing and any cogeneration equipment purchased to
achieve more efficient use of any energy source.” Id.
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promotes “employment in industries relating to the field of
renewable, alternative energies, including the manufacture
and operation of products used to generate electricity and
other forms of energy from alternative sources.”239 This latter
credit is set at “$500 for each annual salary that is $50,000
or more,”240 so it is calculated without reference to the wholesale markets.
Hughes provided no specific guidance about whether this
sort of targeted incentive is “tethered” to wholesale market
participation. If “direct subsidies” are permissible, both of
these incentives appear to be exactly what the Court had in
mind. The mere fact that an incentive relates to the electricity industry and might prompt a power plant to locate in the
state does not appear to be a sufficient “tether” to the wholesale markets. Indeed, the Court’s support for the proposition
that states have wide latitude to encourage new power plants
suggests otherwise.
In this regard, the origins of the language “untethered to
a generator’s wholesale market participation” in the respondents’ merits brief241 may be revealing. The petitioners had
argued that invalidating the Maryland program would preclude the state from taking any action that would “affect the
price signals” of the wholesale markets.242 The respondents
claimed this generalization was overbroad,243 as the state
could “make those price signals less relevant by subsidizing
new generation through tax incentives or similar financial support untethered to a generator’s wholesale market
participation.”244 What Maryland could not do was to “override the price signals” directly by adding its subsidy.245 Perhaps, then, the Court believes state initiatives are permissible
if they are calculated independently, without reference to the
market prices. The impact on wholesale prices is incidental
because it is only a byproduct of granting the incentive.
To illustrate the potential difficulties this might cause,
consider the example of a property tax exemption. In Virginia, as in other states, real and personal property taxation is a local matter.246 Suppose a Virginia city adopted
an ordinance exempting a power plant developer from all
local property taxes, to entice the developer to locate there.
Local real property taxes have broad-based impacts and do
not “aim directly” at the wholesale electricity market. Thus,
exemptions from them, like the two tax incentives described
above, would appear to be permissible. This assumption
would collapse if the expected revenue from the wholesale
markets were factored into the calculation process. Suppose
the city were explicit about this, for example, by setting the
tax reduction at the amount necessary to enable the owner
to recover its expected costs based on projected market revenue. That would appear to be as problematic as the program
invalidated in Hughes. However, it is by no means certain
239. Id. § 58.1-439.12:05.
240. Id.
241. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 225, at 39–40.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. (emphasis added).
245. Id.
246. Va. Econ. Dev. P’ship, supra note 237, at 5.
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that a reviewing court would see it this way. The language
in Hughes does not distinguish among “tax incentives” based
on their method of calculation, so it might support allowing
the incentive to stand. On the other hand, as noted above,
Hughes does not give all incentives a free pass, so a reviewing
court has latitude to closely scrutinize calculation methods.
If a court did strike a tax exemption because it was tied
to market payments, this creates a perverse incentive for
state and local taxing authorities to avoid rebuke by being
less transparent about the reasons for granting exemptions.
This introduces an additional element of concern about judicial interpretation of Hughes, as it might require case-by-case
examination of the motive for granting the exemption. The
extent to which an incentive would be suspect could turn on
a matter wholly unrelated to the electricity markets: whether
the city was required to maintain an administrative record
that properly explains its reasons for providing the incentive.
But even if the city does not state the connection to the
markets explicitly, it is still there nonetheless. All incentives
provided to the would-be developer are intended to make
the plant more economically viable. One would expect the
developer as a matter of course to take all projected costs
and expected revenues into account in deciding whether to
build, but that is true of all incentives. Thus, if a “direct
subsidy” is possible, as the Court suggests, the developer’s
expectations may not matter. The motive of only one party
to the subsidy transaction—the state—would be pertinent;
the developer’s internal calculation would be irrelevant. All
of this will be hashed out in future cases, which is a recipe
for considerable uncertainty.

B.

Supporting Existing Power Plants in Wholesale
Markets: The New York “Zero Emissions Credit”
Proposal

Several states have recently contemplated subsidizing aging
nuclear power plants that, their operators claim, have become
uneconomical to run without the subsidies. States have put
forth a number of reasons to justify these initiatives. Some
states rely on nuclear power for as much as 20% or more
of total electricity generation (and much of this is baseload
generation), so, it is argued, losing the plants might threaten
overall system reliability.247 Some states also justify incentives
to nuclear plants on the basis that their generation of electricity produces no greenhouse gases, so these plants constitute a “bridge” to a zero-carbon future.248 In this view, losing
the zero-carbon capacity provided by nuclear power plants
would make it even more difficult to reduce long-run greenhouse gas emissions, as it would be impossible in the short
run to replace this capacity with anything other than fossil
fuel-powered plants.
Hughes does not directly address this type of initiative.
The Court discussed incentives for constructing new power
plants, rather than keeping existing plants operating. It is
hard to imagine, however, that the Court’s logic should apply
247. See discussion infra note 249 and accompanying text, and note 255.
248. See discussion infra notes 249–55 and accompanying text.
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to new market entrants but not to existing participants. The
core of a Hughes analysis is the extent to which a state’s incentive for power plants is calculated with reference to market
prices and, therefore, impinges on FERC’s authority to set
those prices. If existing plants receive subsidies that distort
market prices as much or more as the incentives for new
power plants, those subsidies are also suspect under Hughes.
Yet this raises a set of difficult analytical issues for the states
seeking to subsidize existing plants. Because the plants in
question are already operating, it is impossible to ignore their
participation in wholesale markets. Indeed, in the case of the
struggling nuclear power plants, it is precisely their alleged
failure to cover their costs in the wholesale markets that has
prompted the call for subsidies.
By “untethered to wholesale market participation,”249 the
Court intended that lower courts focus on the closeness of
the link between calculation of the incentive and current or
expected market revenues. How close is close? Consider a
range of ways in which the state might deal with the nuclear
plants’ expected revenue shortfall. On one end of the spectrum, it might attempt to make the plants whole, by giving them the difference between expected market revenues
and their costs. On the other end of the spectrum, the state
could base an incentive on factors having no relationship to
the market.
The saga of the New York ZEC proposal shows the difficulties that courts will have in applying Hughes to subsidy
programs for existing plants. In January 2016, the New
York Department of Public Service (“DPS”) released a staff
report intended to design the state’s Clean Energy Standard (“CES”).250 As subsequently announced in an order in
August 2016, the CES will require all LSEs in the state to
provide 50% of their electricity from renewable sources by
2030.251 The order requires LSEs to procure renewable energy
certificates (“RECs”) to prompt renewable energy development.252 In addition, as a “bridge” to the state’s renewable
energy future, the order establishes a ZEC system for the
electricity produced by the state’s nuclear power plants.253
This is intended to prevent the premature retirement of three
nuclear power plants in upstate New York that make significant contributions to baseload power and grid reliability
without creating greenhouse gas emissions.254 New York’s
Governor, Andrew Cuomo, announced in 2015 that to prevent the premature retirement of these plants, there would be
249. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
250. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 1.
251. N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, Nos. 15E-0302 & 16-E-0270, at 2 (Aug. 2016).
252. Id. at 14.
253. Id. at 19–20.
254. Id.; Hammond & Spence, supra note 25, at 209 (discussing a study by the
New York ISO concluding that closing the Ginna plant, one of the three included in the ZEC program, would seriously hamper reliability in New York).
In 2014, nuclear power made up 31.3% of all electricity generated in the state.
State Electricity Profiles: New York Electricity Profile, U.S. Energy Info. Admin.
tbl. 5, http://www.eia.gov/electricity/state/newyork/ (providing Electric power
industry generation by primary energy source, 1990 through 2014). The three
plants selected for the ZEC mechanism made up just over half of this total,
supplying 16% of the state electricity total. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy
Standard, supra note 228, at 29.
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a financial mechanism to support them.255 The result is the
ZEC system.
As originally envisioned by the PSC staff, ZECs would provide three qualifying nuclear plants in upstate New York 256
with support payments, reflecting their costs of operation. As
with RECs, all LSEs would be required to “procure ZECs
from qualifying plants.”257 However, unlike RECs, whose
value would be determined through trading activity, the
DPS would set the price of ZECs, basing it on the amount
necessary to ensure that the plants stayed in operation.258
Due to the limited number of nuclear power plant owners that would sell ZECs, and to protect ratepayers from the
exercise of market power, the DPS would set the maximum
price paid per ZEC in annual ratemaking proceedings.259 In
the January proposal, that price would have been based upon
the difference between the “anticipated operating costs of the
units and forecasted wholesale prices” in the New York ISO
wholesale markets.260 The staff report indicated this formula
would set an appropriate and fair value for the environmental
benefits (zero carbon emissions) provided by nuclear power
plants.261 Unlike RECs, ZECs could not be used to demonstrate compliance with the renewable energy mandate; they
are a separate system. Moreover, ZECs may only come from
plants that were online before 2015, so they are not intended
to support new nuclear power plants—none of which are
planned in New York in any event.262
Under the original proposal, the DPS would set the ZEC
price by considering the utility’s full cost structure, taking
into account the revenue it would receive from the markets,
and its other costs. Indeed, given the traditional obligation
of PUCs to consider a utility’s fixed and variable costs in
setting rates, this calculation would be required. The ZEC
cost would be passed along to New York ratepayers, as in the
Maryland program invalidated in Hughes.263
This program, as proposed, could not have survived scrutiny under Hughes, as the ZEC price would have involved the
exact sort of direct relationship to wholesale market prices
that Hughes invalidated. The state’s policy would have been
255. Governor Cuomo Directs Department of Public Service to Begin Process to Enact Clean Energy Standard, N.Y. State (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.governor.
ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-directs-department-public-service-begin-process-enact-clean-energy-standard (“[T]he Governor has directed the Department of Public Service to develop a process to prevent the premature retirement of safe, upstate nuclear power plants during this transition[.]”).
256. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 30; William
Opalka, Plan Would Pay NY Nuclear Plants for Zero Emissions, RTO Insider,
Jan. 22, 2016 (observing that the state’s fourth nuclear plant, the Indian Point
power station, would close and would not be included in the ZEC program).
257. Staff White Paper on Clean Energy Standard, supra note 228, at 31.
258. Id. at 32.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 32–33.
262. U.S. Nuclear Reg. Comm’n, Location of Projected New Nuclear Power Reactors,
http://www.nrc.gov/reactors/new-reactors/col/new-reactor-map.html (last visited May 10, 2016).
263. Compare the recent proposal by the utility FirstEnergy to the Ohio PUC for
approval of a surcharge on customer rates to keep aging coal plants in operation. While FirstEnergy stated that the surcharge would be based solely on projections of its power plants’ power production costs, those projections would
include future estimates of successful bids in PJM capacity auctions. Gavin
Bade & Robert Walton, FirstEnergy, Critics File for Rehearing in Ohio Power
Plant Subsidy Case, Utility Dive, May 3, 2016.
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“tethered” to the generator’s participation in the wholesale
market under any reading of Hughes. The ZEC program
would have been designed to influence only the electricity
industry, and it would have taken the wholesale rate as an
input to its decision making process. Indeed, basing the ZEC
value on the difference between market revenue and utility
costs would have been the program’s explicit purpose and the
reason why it would be invalid.264
Perhaps recognizing this problem, the final PSC order
employed a different mechanism for calculating the ZEC:
basing it on a “social cost of carbon” intended to reflect the
actual value of greenhouse gas emissions reductions.265 There
are, of course, numerous and widely varying estimates of
this figure.266 Federal agencies use a carbon price developed
by the Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon (“USIWG”) to incorporate the social costs associated
with carbon dioxide emissions into cost-benefit analyses of
major regulatory actions.267 The order relies on this figure,
subtracting from it an amount reflecting expected revenues
that the nuclear power plants would receive in the Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) program.268 This
acknowledges that to a certain extent the plants are already
compensated for their zero-carbon generation, albeit not in
an amount sufficient to ensure their long-run survival.
The PSC order establishes six two-year “tranches” of credits for the nuclear plants. The formula for calculating the
subsidy in the first two years is different from the formula
that applies to the next ten years. For the first two years
264. Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, supra note
226 (“The reasoning of Hughes suggests that restructured states operating in
organized wholesale markets may not build additional compensation into
schemes that are expressly linked to a need for some amount of income over
the wholesale clearing price.”). The express link between costs and revenues to
determine support payments also calls into question the FirstEnergy proposal
described above, to the extent the analysis relies on future estimates of revenues
from capacity auctions. Bade & Walton, supra note 263. Similarly, the proposed Illinois “Low Carbon Fuel Standard” bill that would require LSEs in that
state to purchase “low carbon energy credits” from sources including nuclear
power, modeled after the New York program, would have been in jeopardy
after Hughes. The issue was skirted in the near term due to the state legislature’s
failure to adopt the proposed bill. H.B. 3293, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess.
(Ill. 2016); Robert Walton, As Nuclear Plants Shutter, State Efforts to Save Them
Are Coming Too Late, Utility Dive, June 6, 2016.
265. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 50–51.
266. Ctr. for Climate and Energy Solutions, Options and Considerations
for a Federal Carbon Tax 6 (2013), http://www.c2es.org/publications/
options-considerations-federal-carbon-tax (“There are many estimates of the
social cost of carbon and they vary widely”); John Wihbey, Understanding the
Social Cost of Carbon—and Connecting It to Our Lives, Yale Climate Connections (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/2015/02/
understanding-the-social-cost-of-carbon-and-connecting-it-to-our-lives/ (discussing different approaches). For some of the many discussions of the merits
of a carbon tax and design considerations, see Shi-Ling Hsu, The Case for a
Carbon Tax (2011), Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Capand-Trade and Complementary Policies, 49 Harv. J. on Legis. 207 (2012), and
Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 Harv.
Envtl. L. Rev. 499 (2009).
267. U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon, Technical Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost of Carbon for
Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive Order 12866, 2 (2013)
[hereinafter U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon, Technical Support Document] (discussing the cost calculations performed by the
Interagency Working Group on Social Cost of Carbon).
268. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 51; see Regional
Greenhouse Gas Initiative, Auction Prices, https://www.rggi.org/market/co2_
auctions/results (last visited Oct. 14, 2016).
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(Tranche 1), the subsidy is the USIWG cost of carbon less
the expected RGGI revenues, converted to a cost per MWh
and resulting in a subsidy of $17.48/MWh.269 Thereafter, the
subsidy is calculated similarly, but subtracts the amount by
which a combination of specified NYISO wholesale energy
and capacity prices exceeds $39 per MWh.270 The order
provides explicitly that this formula is not based on actual
market revenues, stating that, “These components measure
only the change in forecasts over time; they do not establish
energy or capacity prices.”271
The formula for Tranche 1 should pass muster under
Hughes as untethered to wholesale market prices.272 Neither
the USIWG carbon price nor RGGI prices are calculated
with reference to wholesale electricity markets.273 This distinction may seem arbitrary if it results in the power plant
owner recovering the same amount as it would have received
under the original ZEC proposal. However, an incentive program structured in this fashion should be permissible after
Hughes, unless it was structured to account for market conditions (if, for example, the PSC indicated how basing the
Tranche 1 amount on the social cost of carbon would make
up a specific level of expected market revenue shortfall).
New York’s subsidy for Tranches 2 through 5 presents a
more difficult situation. If the test for whether a subsidy survives scrutiny after Hughes involves whether it directly takes
wholesale prices as an input, the state’s formula may be infirm.
The PSC order implicitly acknowledges this by attempting
to distinguish its formula from one subtracting prevailing
energy and capacity prices directly from costs. Whether this
distinction is enough to sway a reviewing court is completely
unknown. Some have argued that Hughes should be read
extremely narrowly in this context.274 In the narrow view,
the only type of incentive that is impermissible is one that
directly changes market prices, and New York’s formula does
not do this.275 They base this conclusion on the final sen269. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 51. Both the
USIWG carbon price and RGGI allowance figures are quoted in dollars per
short ton of emissions. To convert this to dollars per MWh, the PSC employed
a “conversion factor” of 0.53846, reflecting the average emissions per kWh of
electricity across the New York power plant fleet.
270. Order Adopting a Clean Energy Standard, supra note 251, at 6 appx. E (explaining this formula).
271. Id. at 138.
272. However, if this resulted in the plant receiving considerably more than its conventionally calculated revenue requirement, it would leave the DPS open to
a charge that the result was not just and reasonable under New York’s Public
Service Law. N.Y. Pub. Svc. L. § 65 (Consol. 2016).
273. The federal SCC is based on a “comprehensive estimate of climate change damages and includes, among other things, changes in net agricultural productivity, human health, property damages from increased flood risk and changes in
energy system costs, such as reduced costs for heating and increased costs for
air conditioning.” U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA Fact Sheet: Social Cost
Carbon 1 (2015); U.S. Interagency Working Grp. on Soc. Cost Carbon,
Technical Support Document, supra note 267, at 2; see also Shi-Ling Hsu,
A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. Colo. L. Rev. 179 (2011)
(proposing a carbon tax calculated with respect to global temperature changes); Frances C. Moore & Delavane B. Diaz, Temperature Impacts on Economic
Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 Nature Climate Change 127,
127 (2015) (basing the costs of greenhouse gas mitigation on total factor productivity growth and capital depreciation). None of this, of course, links carbon mitigation costs to wholesale electricity market prices.
274. Keith Goldberg, NY Nuke Plant Subsidies Will Likely Face Legal Battle, Law360,
Aug. 2, 2016 (quoting attorneys Daniel Riesel, Joe Fagan, and Harvey Reiter).
275. Id.
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tence in the Hughes majority opinion: “So long as a State
does not condition payment of funds on capacity clearing the
auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the fatal
defect that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.”276 Yet
a reviewing court might find that the relationship between
New York’s subsidy program and the wholesale markets is
too interwoven to survive scrutiny. While the PSC did not
base the amount of the subsidy on expected market revenue,
it did use a specific level of revenue as a subsidy floor. Payment of subsidies under these circumstances could be considered as tethered to market participation by virtue of using the
floor as an input to the subsidy calculation process. Litigation
to clear up this situation is virtually guaranteed.277
Given all these uncertainties, and more, it is unlikely
that the Court had any of this in mind when it drew up the
laundry list of measures like tax incentives that it thought
would be permissible. “Aiming at the wholesale market,”
“untethered to a generator’s wholesale market participation,”
and “condition on participation in the wholesale market” are
words likely to bedevil federal courts for years to come. In
the absence of yet another Supreme Court decision clarifying its new positions on electricity federalism,278 more guidance is not likely to be forthcoming. This language offers
little predictability. The state can always request that FERC
approve its program as leading to just and reasonable wholesale rates, but that approval may not be likely if the market
impacts are substantial. States will have to either vet their
statutory and regulatory initiatives with FERC, or run the
risk of expensive litigation.

IV.

Conclusion

Prior to ONEOK, FERC v. EPSA and Hughes, several years
had elapsed since the Court had issued any decision involving the electric grid, much less three in one year. These three
cases taken together are likely to be the Supreme Court’s last
word on electricity law and policy for years to come, and signal a new era of allocating jurisdictional responsibility over
the electric grid.279
Taken as a whole, several conclusions may be drawn from
these cases. First, FERC has sweeping authority to transform the electric grid under the “directly affecting” test,280
subject to certain limitations. When new technologies for
generating, storing, and transmitting electricity reach their
full potential, FERC can step in and redesign the wholesale
markets to accommodate them. It should cooperate with the
276. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
277. See generally Goldberg, supra note 274.
278. Hammond, Energy Law’s Jurisdictional Boundaries—Take Three, supra note
226 (noting that after Hughes, “[w]e are likely now in the position of awaiting
‘Take Four.’”).
279. See Bravender, supra note 121 (quoting the author, stating, “I think we will
look back on these series of decisions decades from now as foundational and
landmark decisions that allocate responsibility for governing the grid in a very
different way than the bright line split of the Federal Power Act would seem
to imply.”).
280. Rossi & Wellinghoff, supra note 7, at 31 (“FERC cannot shy away from
exercising its statutory responsibility to set basic ground rules for interstate
energy markets—including the elimination of significant state barriers,
where warranted.”).

states,281 but has substantial latitude to affect their initiatives. At the same time, the states can take actions under
broad-based statutes such as antitrust and tax laws. They can
pursue their own energy goals as long as their subsidies do
not directly target FERC-jurisdictional wholesale rates. After
Hughes, many questions about the scope of this authority are
put off to the future.
Second, these decisions mark the end of dual federalism
in electricity law because it can no longer be said that federal
and state actions are disconnected. As the Court has now
noted, the bright line between federal and state jurisdiction
is unworkable in the modern, interconnected electric grid.
Instead, the Court has recognized in all three cases, the two
levels of government are now interconnected for the foreseeable future. FERC v. EPSA’s “directly affecting” standard
and Hughes’ invalidation of the Maryland contract for differences give FERC authority while preserving latitude for
states to act. Thus, both may act simultaneously even if it
impacts the other: FERC may act even if it impacts retail
rates, and the states can act if they do not “disregard” wholesale rates. This new electricity federalism is not ideologically
driven, but instead is a pragmatic approach to the modern
realities.282 Nor is it an unwelcome development in light of
the modern movement from dual federalism to concurrent
jurisdictional approaches generally.283
Finally, the jurisdictional division of responsibility
between FERC and the states is now a matter of experimentation rather than a system governed by hard and fast rules.
FERC v. EPSA is no pure jurisdictional grab at the states’
expense, as Justice Kagan’s “notable solicitude” for states’
efforts is an indication that states will be active participants

in shaping the grid’s future.284 But it may result in FERC
actions that bring new participants into the wholesale markets, which would inevitably prompt jurisdictional clashes
with the states.285
The challenge of striking the jurisdictional balance accurately after these decisions shows that while the Court has
given FERC the green light to act boldly, it was demonstrably uncomfortable with sorting out all of the potential consequences for the states. Hughes and ONEOK set overarching
principles and allow for case-by-case determination of state
interference with the federal scheme, rather than aspiring
to doctrinal precision. In states whose utilities do not participate in organized wholesale markets, of course, the principles of traditional electricity regulation will continue to
apply as before.
One conclusion implicit in all three of these decisions is
that there is no need for a new or revamped FPA. While
modern challenges seemed to have stressed this venerable
statute near its conceptual breaking point, it has demonstrated its remarkable flexibility to handle today’s challenges.
Wisely, the Court appears to recognize that the FPA governs
a complex, highly technical and rapidly evolving industry,
that the Court lacks the expertise of federal and state regulators, and that it might make a serious misstep if it did more
to precisely define how the FPA should govern the federalstate relationship going forward. But there has been no
suggestion that statutory overhaul is necessary. On the contrary, the Court has relied explicitly on the statutory text to
address matters never foreseen in 1935. For that reason, the
FPA remains a solid foundation on which to build a robust,
modern electric grid.

281. Id. (deeming it “particularly important for FERC to consider using a cooperative federalism approach” because many technologies for the grid’s future are
only now under development).
282. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. 1288, was unanimous, and the two earlier decisions crossed
ideological lines: Justices Alito and Kennedy joined Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion in ONEOK, supra note 3, and Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy joined Justice Kagan’s majority opinion in FERC v. EPSA, supra note 1.
283. Young, supra note 6, at 145 (noting that, “just as concurrent regulatory jurisdiction can coexist with federal supremacy, it is also not inconsistent with
the idea that certain powers may be exclusively vested in one government or
the other.”).

284. Hoskins & Roberti, supra note 5, at 21 (“Some may read Justice Kagan’s opinion as an expansion of federal jurisdiction at the expense of state power, but we
see it otherwise.”).
285. See generally Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector,
supra note 5.
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